Certainty of Intention

- Opening line: The Courts require an immediate (*Harpur*) and objective intention (*Byrnes*) to create a trust.
- Not necessary for the settlor to use the word '**trust**' or any other technical or legal word to create a valid trust (*Re Armstrong*)
- Question is whether in all the circumstances the words and conduct of the alleged settlor evince an express intention to create a trust? (*Paul v Constance*)

• What will evidence CI?

- o If there is a written, unambiguous trust document, as there was in *Byrnes*, then the court will only look at the document, and not consider any surrounding circumstances.
- o Ambiguous words (e.g. *Paul v Constance*) → courts can consider the settlor's words and actions; i.e. surrounding circumstances
- o Oral trust → courts can assess surrounding circs
- o In terms of objective intention a revocation clause can actually evidence intention to create a trust. In effect it says, I have an intention but I wish to reserve the right to revoke it.
- Court will never consider subjective intention (*Byrnes*). Exception: sham trusts
 (*Condon*) N.B. sham trust is very high threshold and is defined to be a case where
 the settlor never intended to give rise to the 'ordinary incidents of a trust' (*Condon* per
 Leeming JA at [69]). Thus even where there is an improper motive the trust will not
 be a sham (Ibid)
- Onus: The onus of proving that the settlor had intended to create the trust lies on the person purporting that the trust exists (*Harpur v Levy*).
- <u>Timing</u>: Intention must be present at creation but later conduct consistent with the original intention will provide further evidence in favour of the intention (*Paul*)
- Unless the settlor has expressly allowed for <u>revocation</u> then that <u>disposal</u> is final and revocation clauses must be articulated carefully see <u>Mallet</u>

• Is there a contracts and/or managed investment scheme?

- o If contract is written expressly we don't delve into intention and conduct a 'wider' inquiry (*Korda* per Gageler J)
- The case of *Trident* suggests that a commercial contract needs to explicitly use the wording 'on trust' as the Court will use narrow and commercial interpretation and may infer lack of intention from the omission.

• Obligations vs precatory words:

- o Precatory words are defined as 'words of prayer, entreaty, recommendation, desire or hope' (Jacobs' Law of Trusts in Australia, 58).
- o Creation of trust requires obligatory or 'imperative' language (*Re Williams*).
- o In *The Countess of Bective v The FCT* Dixon J described four categories of obligations:
 - 1. Property given to A with precatory words favouring B
 - 2. Property given to A with personal equitable obligation favouring B
 - 3. Property given to A with equitable charge favouring B
 - 4. Property given to A to hold on trust for B

| Primary Gift | Subject to? | Outcome | Result |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| \$1000 left to A | Precatory words in | A takes gift; under no | A = \$1000 |
| | favour of B | obligation to B | B = \$0 |
| \$1000 left to A | Condition which | If A accepts gift, A | A = \$1000, but |
| | favours B (for example | must preform condition | must pay B \$200 |

| | on condition that A pays B \$200 | (personal equitable obligation) | *A can pay out of personal funds |
|---|--|---|---|
| \$1000 left to A | For a purpose of benefitting B (for example, to pay for B's guitar lessons) | A takes gift, subject to equitable charge in B's favour | A must pay for B's guitar lessons, but can keep any surplus |
| \$1000 left to A but not for the benefit of A | For the benefit of B | A holds as T on B's behalf | A = \$0 B = \$1000 |

Case examples:

- Re Armstrong: cheques with writing George Armstrong in regards of William Armstrong' and 'George Armstrong in regards of Bernard Armstrong' evidenced sufficient CoI.
- *Paul*: Mr Constance said 'the money is ours to share' 'the money is as much yours as mine' to Ms Paul this evidenced intention
- Re Williams: Dr Williams left estate to wife '... absolutely, in the fullest confidence that she will carry out my wishes...' → No trust, not even obligation just precatory words
- Dean v Cole: 'trusting to her that she will...divide in fair just and equal shares between my children...' → precatory words
- Gill v Gill: Homestead to son 'that he keep the homestead as a home and provide board and residence for his sisters' if they were unmarried \rightarrow personal equitable obligation.