Private International Law B LAWS 3457 Semester 2 2015

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SAMPLE EXTRACT



Topic 2. Personal Connecting Factor

2.1. Concept of domicile

2.1.1. Overview

- a) Domicile is the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality or country [Bell v Kennedy (1868)]
- b) There are 3 categories of domicile:
 - Domicile of origin;
 - Domicile of choice; and
 - Domicile of dependency.
- c) Until the age of 18, a person has a dependent domicile. At the age of 18, a person has an individual domicile.
- d) Every individual has a legal system that constitutes that person's home for the purposes of private international law at all points of their life.
- e) Domicile is a connection/relationship between a person and a legal system (geographical area with a system of private law).
 - In systems such as Australia's or UK, a person may have multiple domiciles due to the federation structure (State law and Federal law).

2.1.2. Role of domicile in jurisdiction and choice of law

- a) Originating process of the Supreme Court of NSW may be served outside Australia if the defendant is domiciled, or ordinarily resident, in NSW [UCPR r 11.2 and Schedule 6(g)]
- b) Domicile in Australia as basis of jurisdiction of the Family Court of Australia in proceedings for dissolution of marriage [Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 39(3)(b)]
- c) Succession to movable property governed by law of the deceased person's domicile
- Dominant role of domicile in relation to the essential validity of marriage under the common law rules of private international law

2.1.3. Statutory reform

- a) Around 1982, there was an Australia wide reform of domicile through the *Domicile Act 1982* (Cth) and *Domicile Act 1979* (NSW) s 4(1), (2).
 - NB: for the purpose of this course, we will be citing the *Domicile Act 1979* (NSW).
 - The domicile of a person before 1 July 1982 is to be determined as if the *Domicile Act* had not been enacted. [s 4(1) *DA*; *Parnell Schoneveld v Repatriation Commission* [2003] FCA 153]
 - However, if we are determining where a person is domiciled after 1 July 1982 with reference to past events such as births etc, we are to determine the domicile as if the *Domicile Act* had been enacted. [s 4(2) DA]
- b) The *Domicile Act* only excludes the common law where expressly stated. Accordingly, most of the principles that determine domicile are common law principles.

2.1.4. Domicile in a union or federation

- a) Where a person is domiciled in a part of a country (i.e. South Australia, NSW etc), the person is deemed to be domiciled in the country forming part of that union (i.e. Australia) [Domicile Act 1979 (NSW) s 10]
- b) Response to *Re Benko* [1968] situation where the plaintiff intended to make South Australia his home but this was not sufficient to make Australia his domicile.

Case Name	Re Benko [1968] SASR 243	
Facts	Benko acquired domicile of origin (according to birth) in <u>Hungary</u> .	
	Benko came to Australia as a displaced person after WWII in 1950 and wished to make Australia his home	
	o Initially settles in Victoria then moves to SA	
	Benko dies in 1964 – no doubt that he <u>intended to make his home in SA</u>	
	However, the law of Hungary declared him to be dead on 5 August 1950	
Issue	Where was Benko domiciled on 5 August 1950.	
Held	Benko domiciled in Hungary on 5 August 1950 and is declared dead at that time.	
Reasoning	• The common law (now amended by s 10 <i>DA</i>) did not recognise 'domicile in Australia' and required 'domicile in a state or territory'.	
	• Evidence insufficient to show that he had obtained a domicile of choice in Australia by 5 August 1950.	
	 Merely needs to be lawfully present in the domicile with an intention to make it his domicile indefinitely 	
	O However, could not be domiciled in Australia (as Australia was not regarded as a country of domicile at that time – need to refer to domiciled state e.g. South Australia)	
	 Further, there was no evidence he intended to make SA his home indefinitely at that point. 	
	Person cannot abandon domicile of origin – <u>may displace domicile of origin via domicile of choice</u>	
NB	Section 10 Domicile Act 1979 (NSW) enacted to remedy the Re Benko issue	

2.1.5. Domicile of corporations

- a) Domicile of a corporation is the place of incorporation.
- b) The lex domicilii determines:
 - Matters related to the status of corporations i.e. amalgamation with another corporation or dissolution of the corporation [National Bank of Greece and Athens v Metliss]
 - The contractual capacity of a corporation [Carse v Coppen]
- c) However, if a <u>corporation is a party to a contractual obligation</u>, then the <u>proper law of the contract</u> determines whether the contract has been performed, varied, novated or discharged [Adams v National Bank of Greece [1961]]

Case Name	National Bank of Greece and Athens v Metliss [1958] AC 509
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Facts	In 1927, the National Mortgage Bank of Greece issued sterling mortgage bonds (\$29,000) to Metliss
	Repayment of the sterling bonds was guaranteed by another bank (National Bank of Greece)
	Guarantee expressed to be English law
	• In 1953, a statute was enacted by Greek government amalgamating two banks (resulting in the National Bank of Greece and Athens) such that it adopted all the guarantees
	Metliss claimed against the amalgamated bank for guarantee from its predecessor bank
Issue	Whether the foreign statute is to be recognised in England to place on the amalgamated bank the liability of the predecessor bank under the guarantee
Held	Recognised in England
Reasoning	• The statute purports to substitute the amalgamated bank for the predecessor bank under the guarantee (<u>novation</u>)
	o Novation is governed by the law of the contract (i.e. <u>the law of England</u>)
	• Alternatively, the <u>statute could be characterised by the law of the status of corporations instead of novation</u>
	O Law of the status of the corporation is governed by the lex domicilii of the bank (i.e. the law of Greece)
	English law would recognise the amalgamated bank as the universal successor according to the Greek statute
	o Considerations of justice, convenience, comity and respect

Case Name	Adams v National Bank of Greece [1961] AC 255
Facts	Same as in National Bank of Greece and Athens except the statute was amended to exclude the liability under sterling mortgage bonds specifically
	This was to have <u>retrospective effect</u>
Issue	Whether the amalgamated bank was liable for repayment under the mortgage bond given the amendment to the statute.
Held	The Greek amendment did not retrospectively remove liability under contracts governed by English law
Reasoning	The amendment could not retrospectively remove liability as the liability arose under English law.
	Characterised as a law relating to the discharge of contractual obligations instead of the status of corporations
	Considerations of justice, convenience, comity and respect <u>did not require</u> recognition of a retrospective law
	• The amendment removing liability would be applicable if the lex causae was Greek law, not under English law.

2.2. Domicile of Origin

2.2.1. Concept of domicile of origin

- a) The domicile acquired by every person at birth by operation of birth
- b) In applying Australian law, it is necessary to use the concept of domicile even if the foreign country does not know of the concept of domicile

2.2.2. Nuptial and ex-nuptial children

- a) Nuptial child is conceived within marriage; ex-nuptial is conceived outside of marriage
- b) A <u>nuptial child</u> takes as its domicile of origin the domicile of the <u>father</u> at the date of the child's birth (not necessarily the father's domicile of origin)
- c) <u>Ex-nuptial child</u> takes as its domicile of origin the domicile of the <u>mother</u> at the date of the child's birth
- d) However, following the <u>Status of Children Act 1996 (NSW)</u> applying to a person born in NSW or elsewhere before or after the commencement of the legislation.
 - Ex-nuptial child is now treated as a nuptial child (takes domicile of the father)

2.2.3. Doctrine of revival and its abolition

- a) <u>Doctrine of revival</u> Abandonment of domicile of choice simply by physically leaving the country and no longer having an intention to make that country home indefinitely.
 - However, if the domicile of choice is abandoned, and has not yet adopted a domicile of choice in another country, in that <u>transitory period</u> <u>domicile of origin applies</u>.
- b) For domicile of choice to be adopted, must have (i) lawful presence in the country and (ii) intention to make that country home indefinitely.
 - Does not matter how fleeting the presence was.
 - Therefore, if somebody was leaving the country of domicile of choice for another country and dies en route, then the domicile will be the domicile of origin
- c) This doctrine of revival has since been abandoned and replaced with:
 - The domicile of choice for a person cannot be abandoned <u>until a new domicile of choice has been acquired</u>. [s 6 DA]
 - This was the position in the US [In Re Jones' Estate]

Case Name	In Re Jones' Estate 182 NW 227 (1921) (Supreme Court of Iowa)
Facts	Jones seeking to avoid maintenance obligations and emigrates from Wales to Iowa
	During the voyage, Jones meets and marries another woman
	Jones was <u>lawfully present in Iowa and intended to make Iowa</u> his home
	• In 1914, Jones' wife dies leading Jones to return to Wales 'to live the rest of his days'
	 Jones purchases a ticket from New York but <u>his ship is torpedoed and he</u> <u>drowned en route</u>.
	O Died without will and most of his assets was monetary and left in Iowa
Issue	Where Jones was <u>domiciled at the time of his death</u> for the purpose of

	determining the applicable system of law: o If Iowa, then the money goes to his ex-nuptial child in Wales; o If Wales (domicile of origin), then the money would go to his brothers and sisters
Held	Iowa was the governing system of law.
Reasoning	Under US common law, <u>a person's domicile cannot be abandoned until the person adopts a new domicile</u> .
NB	• Although Australian common law previously applied the doctrine of revival such that the domicile of origin would be revived, statutory change via the <i>Domicile Act</i> 1979 (NSW) section 6 resulted in the <i>Re Jones</i> position to apply in Australia.

2.2.4. Loss by abandonment?

- a) At common law, a domicile of choice can be abandoned.
 - However, not abandon-able under s 6 Domicile Act 1979 (NSW)
- b) Domicile of origin cannot be abandoned although it can be displaced by a domicile of choice [Bell v Kennedy (1868)]

Case Name	Bell v Kennedy (1868) LR 1 Sc & Div 307
Facts	Bell was born in Jamaica; Bell's father was domiciled by choice in Jamaica
	In 1937, slavery was abolished in Jamaica
	Bell believed there was no future for him in Jamaica: "left Jamaica for good"
	Bell moved to Scotland but not sure where to live permanently; wife died at this point
Issue	Wife's domicile depended on Bell's domicile – at the point of death, it was the domicile of origin, being Jamaica.
Held	Domicile of origin cannot be abandoned – although it can be displaced by a domicile of choice.

2.3. Domicile of Choice

2.3.1. Elements of acquisition of domicile of choice

- a) Acquired by voluntary act requiring:
 - <u>Lawful physical presence</u> in a country (no matter how fleeting); and
 - With the <u>present intention</u> to make that country home <u>indefinitely at that time</u> [s 9 DA]
- b) A person must have <u>capacity to acquire a domicile of choice according to the lex fori</u> [Re Annesley [1926]; In the marriage of [D and AM Hannema (1981) 7 Fam LR 542]
 - Person who is mentally capable acquires the capacity for an independent domicile at the age of 18 years [s 7(1) DA]