

MLP323 Constitutional Law — Sample

Constitutional Law (Sample)

MLP323

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EXAM STUDY GUIDE

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Too — The Constitutional Method: Issue-Spotting and Answer Frameworks

1. Overview

Constitutional problem questions are answered by *method* — a disciplined, repeatable sequence applied to the specific facts, with a reasoned value judgment at the genuinely contestable steps. Every "advise on the constitutional validity" problem is answered by the same engine: characterise each provision, locate a head of power, test every applicable limitation, then sever what cannot be saved.^[1] This chapter is the master method underpinning every other chapter: three decision trees, a two-stage validity architecture, a word-budget model, an issue-spotting cue table, and a one-page master map.

 **Reading Guide:** First pass — the two-stage architecture at §5.1 and the three decision trees at §6. Deep revision — the cue table at §5.4, the master map at §5.6, and the word-budget model at §5.5. Critical thinking — the Critical Perspectives table at §5.7.

 **Exam Weight:** Method is heavily rewarded because it is examined indirectly through almost every problem rather than as a standalone topic. Characterisation is the spine of any question requiring section-by-section validity analysis, and completeness of issue-spotting usually separates a strong answer from an average one. Structural discipline is worth more than any single doctrine, and credit is consistently given for *application and value judgment*, not reciting the test.

2. The Vocabulary of Validity

TERM	DEFINITION	AUTHORITY
Characterisation	The process of deciding whether a Commonwealth law is "with respect to" a subject matter of Commonwealth legislative power in s 51 or s 52.	<i>Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth</i> (2000) 202 CLR 479
Head of power	An enumerated grant of Commonwealth legislative power (a platum of s 51, or s 52, s 61, s 81 or s 96) capable of supporting a law.	Australian Constitution ss 51, 52, 61, 81, 96
Sufficient connection	The basic test of validity for a non-purposive power: whether a sufficient connection exists between the law and the subject matter, assessed by the rights, duties, powers and privileges the law changes.	<i>Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation</i> (1965) 114 CLR 1; <i>Leask v Commonwealth</i> (1996) 187 CLR 579
Dual characterisation	The principle that a law is valid if it answers the description of a law with respect to at least one head of power, even if it also answers a description outside power.	<i>Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth</i> (1976) 136 CLR 1
Non-purposive (subject-matter) power	A power described by an activity, person, object or category of legislation, for which validity turns on connection alone and legislative purpose is irrelevant.	<i>Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth</i> (2000) 202 CLR 479
Purposive power	A power described by an end to be achieved (paradigmatically the defence power, s 51(vi)), for which validity turns on whether the means are reasonably appropriate and adapted to that end.	<i>Thomas v Mowbray</i> (2007) 233 CLR 307
Incidental power	The aspect of every head of power (and the express incidental power in s 51(xxxix)) supporting matters reasonably necessary or appropriate to give effect to the core of the power.	Australian Constitution s 51(xxxix); <i>Leask v Commonwealth</i> (1996) 187 CLR 579
Constitutional limitation	A restriction on otherwise-conferred power — express (eg s 51(xxxi), s 80, s 116, s 117) or implied (the implied freedom, <i>Melbourne Corporation</i> , Ch III/ <i>Boilermakers/Kable</i>).	<i>Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation</i> (1997) 189 CLR 520
Reading down	Construing an over-broad provision so that it operates only within power, where the words fairly permit, to preserve validity.	<i>Coleman v Power</i> (2004) 220 CLR 1
Severance	Excising an invalid provision while preserving the remainder, provided the statute still coheres and operates as Parliament intended.	<i>Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth</i> (1988) 165 CLR 462
Justiciability	Whether a question is amenable to judicial determination at all; some procedural matters (ss 53–54) are not, whereas s 55 and s 57 are.	<i>Cormack v Cope</i> (1974) 131 CLR 432
Legislative self-definition	The rule that Parliament cannot recite itself into power: constitutional validity is determined by the Court on the true character of the law, not by legislative declaration.	<i>Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth</i> (1951) 83 CLR 1

3. Constitutional & Legislative Framework

The method draws on a small set of provisions repeatedly. The characterisation stage looks for a source of power in the first block; the limitation stage looks for a restriction in the second; the inconsistency and severance questions draw on the third.

PROVISION	ROLE IN THE METHOD	STAGE
Australian Constitution s 51 (chapeau)	The concurrent grant — "make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to" 39 subject matters; the workhorse of characterisation.	Power
Australian Constitution s 52	Exclusive Commonwealth powers (Commonwealth places, seat of government); an alternative source alongside s 51.	Power
Australian Constitution s 61	Executive power — the source of the nationhood power and prerogative, engaged (with s 51(xxxix)) where no s 51 head fits.	Power
Australian Constitution s 81	Consolidated Revenue Fund and appropriation; an appropriation mechanism, not a free-standing spending power.	Power
Australian Constitution s 96	Conditional grants to the States "on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit"; a route around gaps in direct power.	Power
Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi)	Acquisition of property on just terms — simultaneously a <i>grant</i> and, in effect, a <i>guarantee</i> limiting every other power.	Power / Limit
Australian Constitution s 80	Trial on indictment by jury — an express limit on Commonwealth criminal procedure.	Limit
Australian Constitution s 109	Resolves conflict between valid State and Commonwealth laws: the Commonwealth prevails, the State law is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.	Inconsistency
Australian Constitution s 107	Preserves the plenary legislative power of the States, subject to withdrawal by the Constitution and to s 109.	State power
Australian Constitution s 128	The referendum procedure — the manner-and-form gateway for altering the Constitution itself.	Procedure

Three provisions must be reproducible verbatim, because they anchor the three trees.

Section 109 — Inconsistency of laws

'When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.'^[2]

Section 51(xxxi) — Acquisition of property on just terms

'The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: ... (xxxi.) The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws'.^[3]

Section 96 — Financial assistance to States

'During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.'^[4]

4. The Twelve Cases You Cannot Enter the Exam Without

These twelve authorities recur across every topic because they define the *method* rather than any single doctrine. A candidate who can state and apply all twelve holds the skeleton of every problem answer.

CASE	CITATION	PRINCIPLE	EXAM APPLICATION
<i>Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd</i> ('Engineers')	(1920) 28 CLR 129	Heads of power are read naturally and given full amplitude; no implied protection of State domain; the reciprocal principle.	The premise of every characterisation answer — open with it.
<i>Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association</i>	(1908) 6 CLR 309	A Constitution is broad and general; the Court should lean to the broader interpretation of a power.	Justifies reading a head of power widely before applying it.
<i>Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth</i>	(2000) 202 CLR 479	The settled characterisation principles: construe with all the generality the words admit; test the legal and practical operation for sufficient connection; dual characterisation suffices; wisdom is irrelevant.	The one-stop citation for the characterisation test.
<i>Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth</i>	(1976) 136 CLR 1	Dual characterisation: one valid character is enough even where the law's purpose lies outside power.	Defeats the "but the real aim is X" argument.
<i>Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation</i>	(1965) 114 CLR 1	A law is tested by its true legal character; a taxing law is valid under s 51(ii) though aimed at conduct outside power.	Sufficient connection via legal operation; the tax/regulation overlap.
<i>Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth</i> ('Communist Party Case')	(1951) 83 CLR 1	Parliament cannot recite itself into power; validity is for the Court, not legislative declaration.	The trap-breaker for deeming and self-serving recitals.
<i>Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth</i>	(1947) 74 CLR 31	The implied federal limitation: the Commonwealth cannot discriminate against or curtail the States' capacity to function as governments.	The limitation stage for laws burdening the States.
<i>Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation</i>	(1997) 189 CLR 520	The implied freedom is a limit on power, not a personal right; the two-limb test; it binds State and Territory power.	The limitation stage for burdens on political communication.
<i>McCloy v New South Wales</i>	(2015) 257 CLR 178	Structured proportionality — suitable, necessary, adequate in the balance — as the second-limb test.	The three-stage ladder where the marks are won.
<i>R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia</i> ('Boilermakers')	(1956) 94 CLR 254	Two limbs: federal judicial power only in a Ch III court; a Ch III court may exercise only judicial (and incidental) power.	The Commonwealth separation-of-powers limitation.
<i>Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)</i>	(1996) 189 CLR 51	A State may not confer on its courts a function incompatible with their institutional integrity as repositories of federal jurisdiction.	The State/Territory-court limitation.
<i>Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn</i>	(1926) 37 CLR 466	Direct inconsistency ("conferral of a right") and Isaacs J's "cover the field" test of indirect inconsistency.	Both branches of the s 109 tree in one citation.

Case Summaries

Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129

A federal industrial award was sought against Western Australian State trading concerns, raising whether Commonwealth conciliation and arbitration power could reach the States as employers. The majority destroyed the reserved powers doctrine and implied intergovernmental immunities: heads of power are con-

strued naturally and given full amplitude, unconstrained by any assumption protecting State domain. Every characterisation answer begins here; the only surviving structural limitation is *Melbourne Corporation*.

| *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479*

Commonwealth plant-variety-rights legislation was challenged as beyond the s 51(xviii) copyrights/patents power. The Court restated the characterisation method: construe the text with all the generality the words admit; test practical and legal operation for a sufficient connection; dual characterisation suffices; the law's wisdom is irrelevant.

| *Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1*

Commonwealth export-control regulations were used to block mineral-sand exports pending an environmental inquiry, the practical object being environmental protection — otherwise a State matter. The Court held that a law with a sufficient connection to a head of power is not invalidated merely because its purpose lies outside power: the regulations were validly connected to the trade and commerce power notwithstanding their environmental object. Answers any fact pattern where the "real" aim is something the Commonwealth could not directly legislate for.

| *Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1*

A Commonwealth taxing provision exempted superannuation funds from income tax conditional on investing in Commonwealth securities, its evident aim being to steer investment rather than raise revenue. The Court held that, in its true legal character, the provision governed a tax and fell within s 51(ii); a practical purpose of influencing conduct outside power did not deprive it of that character. Pair with *Murphyores* whenever a law's ostensible purpose is used to argue invalidity.

| *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1*

Commonwealth legislation dissolved the Communist Party and enabled declarations against affiliated persons, the Act reciting facts said to bring it within the defence power and s 61. The Court held that Parliament cannot recite itself into power: whether a law falls within a head of power is for the Court on the law's true character, and a legislative declaration of the connecting facts does not bind it. The trap-breaker for any statute that "deems" a body to be a corporation, or recites that conduct is a matter of defence — the recital does not manufacture the power.

| *Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466*

A Commonwealth industrial award permitted a 48-hour working week; a New South Wales statute capped the same employees at 44 hours. The Court held the State law inconsistent, establishing the "conferral of a right" form of direct inconsistency (the State law removed the flexibility the award conferred) and, in Isaacs J's reasons, the "cover the field" test of indirect inconsistency — a State law is inconsistent if it enters a field the Commonwealth intended to govern exhaustively. The one citation supplying both branches of the s 109 tree.

5. The Constitutional Method

| 5.1 The two-stage architecture: power first, then limits, then severance

Every validity problem resolves into two questions in a fixed order. **Stage one — power:** is the law supported by a source of Commonwealth legislative power?^[5] Only if yes does **stage two — limitation** follow: does the law, though supported, offend a constitutional limit?^[6] A law failing stage one is invalid for want of power and never reaches stage two; a law passing stage one may still be struck down at stage two. Where invalidity is confined to particular provisions, a **third step — severance** — asks whether the valid remainder can stand alone.^[7]

The order matters: power is answered fully before limits are opened, because a limit presupposes a valid grant to restrict.^[8] Testing the implied freedom before establishing power at all signals a candidate who has not grasped the architecture.

5.2 Stage one: locating a source of power

The characterisation enquiry, drawn from *Grain Pool*, proceeds provision by provision.^[9] First, identify the legal operation of the section — the rights, duties, powers and privileges it changes.^[10] Second, ask whether that operation has a sufficient connection to a head of power in s 51 or s 52, reading it broadly.^[11] A single law may be supported by a combination of heads and needs only one valid character to survive.^[12]

The enquiry differs by *type* of power. For a **non-purposive** power — the great bulk of s 51 — once a sufficient connection is shown, purpose is irrelevant.^[13] For a **purposive** power — paradigmatically defence, s 51(vi) — validity turns on whether the means are reasonably appropriate and adapted to the end.^[14] Every head also carries an **incidental** aspect supporting matters reasonably necessary to give effect to its core.^[15]

Where no s 51/s 52 head fits, three fallbacks remain: **s 61 + s 51(xxxix)** (nationhood, *Pape*); a **s 96** grant; or **s 81** appropriation with a substantive spending source elsewhere, since s 81 authorises appropriation only.^[16]

5.3 Stage two: the limitations inventory

A supported law is still invalid if it offends a constitutional limit, and the limits are both express and implied.^[17] The reliable inventory to run against every provision is:

- **Section 51(xxxi) — acquisition of property on just terms.** A limit implied from the placitum's guarantee: a Commonwealth acquisition of property requires just terms, so a law effecting an acquisition without them is invalid.^[18]
- **Express rights and guarantees** — s 80 (trial by jury on indictment), s 116 (religion), s 117 (out-of-State residents), each narrowly construed but decisive where engaged.^[19]
- **The implied freedom of political communication** — a limit on legislative and executive power (not a personal right) derived from ss 7, 24, 64 and 128, tested by the *Lange* two-limb formulation and, at the second limb, *McCloy* structured proportionality.^[20]
- **The *Melbourne Corporation* principle** — the Commonwealth cannot significantly impair the States' capacity to function as governments; the territories are not protected.^[21]
- **Chapter III separation of judicial power** — the two *Boilermakers* limbs at the Commonwealth level, and the *Kable* principle protecting the institutional integrity of State and Territory courts.^[22]

Only after the limits are cleared is the provision valid; where a limit bites, ask whether it can be read down before declaring it invalid, and then whether it can be severed.^[23]

5.4 Issue-spotting: the fact-pattern cue table

A stable set of factual cues recurs across problem questions. When a cue appears, the issue and the leading authority are effectively fixed — read the fact pattern once against the left column before writing.

FACT-PATTERN CUE IN THE PROBLEM	ISSUE TRIGGERED	HEAD OF POWER / LIMITATION	LEADING AUTHORITY
A Cth law commandeering State staff or records , or abolishing a State office	Impairs State capacity	<i>Melbourne Corporation</i> limitation	<i>Clarke</i>
A fixed levy or charge on a class of persons	Tax vs fee-for-service; s 51(ii); s 55	Taxation power / limits	<i>Air Caledonie</i>
A law taking possession or control of property (even without title)	Acquisition on just terms	s 51(xxxi) limitation	<i>Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel</i>
A court or judge compelled to act on executive say - so	Institutional integrity	<i>Kable</i> limitation	<i>South Australia v Totani</i>
A Ch III judge given a non-judicial job	<i>Boilermakers</i> limb 2; <i>persona designata</i>	Ch III limitation	<i>Hilton v Wells</i>
Restricting protest, donations, advertising or party participation	Burden on political communication	Implied freedom	<i>Lange</i> ; <i>McCloy</i>
A grant of money to a State on conditions	s 96 conditional grant (+ s 51(xxxi) limit)	s 96 power	<i>ICM Agriculture</i>
A treaty signed then a domestic law "to implement" it	External affairs, treaty aspect	s 51(xxix) power	<i>Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam)</i>
Signing or ratifying a treaty before any statute	Executive/prerogative act	s 61 (not s 51(xxix))	<i>Barton v Commonwealth</i>
An offence reaching conduct "in Australia or elsewhere"	Geographic externality	s 51(xxix) power	<i>New South Wales v Commonwealth (Seas and Submerged Lands Case)</i>
A Cth law excluding or overriding State law on the same subject	s 109 inconsistency (express cover-the-field)	s 109	<i>Wenn v Attorney-General (Vic)</i>
A judge-alone trial for an indictable Cth offence	Jury guarantee — mandatory	s 80 limitation	<i>Brown v The Queen</i>
Disadvantaging out-of-State residents	Residence discrimination (substance)	s 117 limitation	<i>Street v Queensland Bar Association</i>
A corporation defined by its trading or financial activities	Corporations power activities test	s 51(xx) power	<i>R v Federal Court of Australia</i> ; <i>Ex parte WA National Football League</i> ; <i>Work Choices</i>

5.5 The word-budget model for a capped answer

A word- or time-capped assessment turns the mark allocation into a planning instrument: convert the marks for each part into a word allocation before writing, and treat the figure as a ceiling. A useful rule of thumb is roughly 33 words per mark under a strict 2,000-word cap for a 60-mark paper, with headings and references counted — see the Quick Reference Card (§10) for the full mark-to-word table.^[24]

The same logic applies within a multi-part question: sub-parts worth roughly 8/6/8/3 marks, plus a short issue map, convert to roughly 270/200/270/100 words, leaving ~160 for framing.^[25] A 5-mark sub-part has room for one authority per proposition and then application, not a doctrine's history; long recitations

lose marks by opportunity cost, since marks reward application and value judgment, not reproducing the test; and short case-forms (*Lange*, *McCloy*) protect the budget without loss of substance.^[26]


5.6 Constitutional law on a page

The whole unit reduces to a single map. A valid *Commonwealth* law needs a source of power and must clear every limit; a valid *State* law rests on the plenary grant preserved by s 107 but must clear its own (smaller) set of limits and then survive s 109 where a Commonwealth law occupies the same ground.

5.7 Critical Perspectives

The method is not mechanical: at the contestable steps — how widely to read a head of power, whether an implied limitation exists, how demanding proportionality should be — the answer depends on interpretive commitments the High Court itself contests.

PERSPECTIVE	SOURCE	ARGUMENT	COUNTER-ARGUMENT
Legalism / literalism	<i>Engineers</i> (1920) 28 CLR 129	Heads of power read for their natural meaning, free of implications protecting the States.	Cannot explain the Court's own implications — Ch III, <i>Melbourne Corporation</i> , the implied freedom are all implied, not textual.
Purposive / structural implication	<i>Lange</i> (1997) 189 CLR 520	Legitimate implications are drawn from text and structure and should not be feared.	Untethered implications risk judicial law-making; the implied freedom's reach has proved hard to confine.
Structured proportionality	<i>McCloy</i> (2015) 257 CLR 178	A three-stage test disciplines the enquiry and makes the value judgment transparent.	Only a plurality favoured it in <i>Tajjour v New South Wales</i> (2014) 254 CLR 508; it displaces the older flexible standard.



****Figure 0.1: Advise on validity — the three-stage decision spine.**** Stage 1 secures a head of power; Stage 2 tests every applicable limit; Stage 3 severs any offending provision. Skipping a stage loses marks even when the answer is otherwise correct.

6. Decision Trees: The Three Master Frameworks

Three decision trees follow, one for each question a problem can pose. Run the applicable tree top to bottom, resolving each branch on the facts with its authority. The *Commonwealth* tree addresses whether a Commonwealth law is valid; the *State* tree, whether a State law is valid; the *inconsistency* tree, whether an otherwise-valid State law is rendered inoperative by s 109.^[27]

6.1 Is a Commonwealth law valid?

1. **Characterise each section separately.** Identify the legal operation — the rights, duties and privileges it changes.^[28]
2. **Find a source of power.**
 - Within a s 51 or s 52 head? A combination of heads may support the one law.^[29]
 - **Core** or **incidental**? If core, purpose is irrelevant (except a purposive power such as defence); if incidental, is it reasonably appropriate to give effect to the core?^[30]
 - No s 51/s 52 fit: consider **s 61 + s 51(xxxix)** (nationhood, *Pape*); a **s 96** grant; or **s 81** with a substantive spending source.^[31]
3. **No source → invalid** for want of power; Parliament cannot recite the law into power.^[32]
4. **If supported, test every limitation.** Express/implied rights (s 51(xxxi), s 80, s 116, s 117, implied freedom); separation of powers (*Boilermakers*); *Melbourne Corporation* (significant impairment of State capacities?).^[33]
5. **Consider any procedure** (ss 57, 128) if raised.^[34]
6. **Sever** unconstitutional parts if the statute still functions.^[35]

6.2 Is a State law valid?


1. **Start from plenary power.** A State Parliament has a general grant and may legislate on most concurrent s 51 matters; no enumerated head is needed.^[36]
2. **Test the limits that bind the States.**
 - Express/implied rights — s 117, the implied freedom, Ch III due process.^[37]
 - **Kable** — the law must not confer on a State court a function incompatible with its institutional integrity as a repository of federal jurisdiction.^[38]
 - **Cigamatic** — the law must not impair or deny Commonwealth executive capacities under s 61, though a general law regulating the *exercise* of those capacities is valid.^[39]
3. **Consider any restrictive procedure** — manner-and-form requirements such as s 18(1B), (2), (2A)–(2AA) of the *Constitution Act 1975* (Vic).^[40]
4. **If a valid Commonwealth law also operates, go to the s 109 tree** (§6.3).^[41]

6.3 Is there a s 109 inconsistency?

Section 109 is reached only once both provisions are independently valid; it is a rule of priority, not a test of validity.^[42] Run the three branches in order — direct inconsistency first, since if made out the cover-the-field question need not be considered.^[43]

1. **Direct — simultaneous obedience.** Is it impossible to obey both laws at once?^[44]
2. **Direct — conferral of a right.** Would the State law alter, impair or detract from a right, privilege or scheme the Commonwealth law confers, significantly (non-trivially)?^[45]

- 3. Indirect — cover the field.** Did the Commonwealth intend its law as a complete, exhaustive statement, and does the State law enter that field?^[46] An express "cover the field" clause is as effective as an inferred intention; an express non-exclusion clause preserves the State law.^[47]
- 4. Consequence.** Where any branch is satisfied, the Commonwealth law prevails and the State law is inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency — not struck out, and capable of reviving if the Commonwealth law is repealed.^[48]



****Figure 0.2: The seven-step issue-spotting checklist.**** Walking the checklist before writing ensures every issue in the fact pattern is identified and addressed — the single highest-leverage exam technique.

7. Exam Application

The method earns its keep only under exam conditions. This section converts the trees into a way of reading a problem and a template for writing one.

7.1 Common fact patterns: the question archetypes

Where §5.4 mapped factual *cues* to issues, this table maps *whole-question shapes* to the tree that answers each.

QUESTION SHAPE (TRIGGER WORDING)	WHAT THE METHOD DEMANDS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY
"Advise on the validity of the [Cth] Act" — section by section	Run the Commonwealth tree (§6.1) on each section	<i>Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth</i> (2000) 202 CLR 479
"Does the [State/Territory] law infringe the implied freedom?"	Threshold burden, then <i>Lange</i> two limbs and <i>McCloy</i> proportionality	<i>Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation</i> (1997) 189 CLR 520
"What effect will the Commonwealth Act have on the State Act?"	Run the s 109 tree (§6.3); "invalid" means inoperative	<i>Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn</i> (1926) 37 CLR 466
"What power authorised the executive to do X?"	Separate the executive act (s 61) from later legislative implementation (s 51(xxix))	<i>Barton v Commonwealth</i> (1974) 131 CLR 477
"Does the Commonwealth Act offend <i>Melbourne Corporation</i> ?"	Significant impairment of State capacity, via the <i>Clarke</i> factors	<i>Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth</i> (1947) 74 CLR 31
"Does a State law directing a court offend Ch III?"	<i>Kable</i> institutional integrity	<i>Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)</i> (1996) 189 CLR 51

7.2 Question Type 1 — "Advise on the constitutional validity of a Commonwealth Act"

This archetype is answered by running §6.1 once for each section of the Act.

Approach. Take each section separately and never blend them.^[49] For each: state its legal operation in one sentence; locate a head of power via the shortest valid route; test each limitation; conclude before moving on; and reserve words in proportion to the marks (§5.5). One valid character is enough.^[50] Where no s 51/s 52 head fits, reach for s 61 with s 51(xxxix), a s 96 grant, or s 81 with a substantive spending source.^[51] A law taking possession or control of property engages s 51(xxxi): deprivation of the reality of proprietorship suffices, but the Commonwealth must also acquire an identifiable benefit, and absent just terms the section falls.^[52]

Sample Paragraph (I–R–A–C). "Section 4, empowering the Commonwealth to take possession and control of privately owned quarantine facilities during a declared health emergency, must be characterised on its own operation before any limit is tested.^[53] Its legal operation transfers exclusive use of identified private property to the Commonwealth. A connection to the nationhood power (s 61 with s 51(xxxix)) is arguable where only national action can meet a genuine emergency (*Pape v Commissioner of Taxation* (2009) 238 CLR 1). The decisive question is then s 51(xxxi): taking possession and control deprives the owners of the reality of proprietorship, which suffices without transfer of title (*Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel* (1944) 68 CLR 261), and exclusive Commonwealth occupation is an identifiable benefit amounting to an acquisition (*Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth* (1997) 190 CLR 513). As the section provides no just terms, it is invalid unless a severable just-terms mechanism can be read with it (*Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth* (1988) 165 CLR 462)."

7.3 Question Type 2 — "Is there a s 109 inconsistency?"

Answered by the third tree (§6.3), reached only once both laws are separately valid.

Approach. Confirm each law's independent validity, then run the three branches in order and stop at the first satisfied.^[54] Direct inconsistency arises where simultaneous obedience is impossible, or the State law alters, impairs or detracts from a Commonwealth right significantly.^[55] Indirect inconsistency turns on an intention that the Commonwealth law be a complete statement of the law; an express "cover the field" clause is as effective as an inferred intention, and a non-exclusion clause preserves the State law.^[56] "Invalid" means inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency, not void; the State law revives if the Commonwealth law is repealed.^[57]

Sample Paragraph (I–R–A–C). "Section 3 of the State Act, capping the working week at 44 hours, is not inoperative under s 109 unless inconsistent with a Commonwealth award permitting a 48-hour week, both being separately valid.^[58] Simultaneous obedience is possible in one sense, since an employer working 44 hours breaches neither instrument (*R v Licensing Court of Brisbane; Ex parte Daniell* (1920) 28 CLR 23). The sharper question is whether the cap alters, impairs or detracts from a right the award confers — flexibility up to 48 hours — significantly (*Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn* (1926) 37 CLR 466). Alternatively, if the award was intended as a complete statement of permissible hours, the State law enters a covered field (*Clyde Engineering* per Isaacs J). Either branch leaves the award prevailing and s 3 inoperative to the extent, not void (*University of Wollongong v Metwally* (1984) 158 CLR 447)."

7.4 The Marker's Eye

Credit is consistently given for application of the test to the facts, capped by a value judgment at the genuinely contestable step.^[59] Recitation is an opportunity cost — every word restating a test is a word not spent scoring.

EARNs MARKS	WASTES WORDS
Applying the test to the facts; a value judgment at the contestable step	Reciting a doctrine's history when not asked
Characterising each section separately and concluding on each	A global conclusion that never engages individual sections
Short case-forms (<i>Lange</i> , <i>McCloy</i>) to protect the budget	Full citations repeated — they count towards the cap

8. Exam Tips & Traps

✓ Do

- Characterise each section separately and find at least one head of power before turning to any limit.^[60]
- Answer the head-of-power question before the limitation question — a limit presupposes a valid grant.^[61]
- Prefer the shortest valid characterisation; one valid character is enough, even where another lies outside power.^[62]
- Plan the word budget from the marks *before* writing, and treat each figure as a ceiling (\$5.5).

✗ Don't

- Don't treat s 81 as a free-standing spending power — it authorises appropriation only; the authority to spend must be found elsewhere.^[63]
- Don't accept a legislative recital as establishing power; the Court, not Parliament, decides validity on the law's true character.^[64]
- Don't analyse the implied freedom as a personal right — it limits legislative and executive power, and the question is the effect of the law on the freedom.^[65]

⚠ Watch Out For

- Section 96 cannot sidestep the s 51(xxxi) just-terms guarantee — a grant condition replicating a struck-down acquisition still needs just terms.^[66]
- Signing or ratifying a treaty is an executive (prerogative) act sourced to s 61; don't jump to s 51(xxix), which supports the separate *legislative* implementing step.^[67]
- *Kable* binds State **and** Territory courts even though no formal separation of powers operates at State level.^[68]
- Territories are **not** protected by *Melbourne Corporation* (s 122) — an argument that a law impairs a Territory's capacity mislocates the limit.^[69]

9. Connections to Other Topics

Each stage of the method hands off to a substantive chapter developing its authorities.

CHAPTER	HOW THIS CHAPTER CONNECTS TO IT
T01 — Australian Constitutionalism	Interpretive premises characterisation assumes — <i>Engineers, Jumbunna</i> .
T02 — Parliament, Legislative Procedures and Manner and Form	The procedure step (ss 57, 128; Victorian restrictive procedures).
T03 — Characterisation of Commonwealth Laws	Sufficient connection, dual characterisation, purposive/non-purposive.
T04 — Financial and Economic Powers	The s 81 and s 96 fallbacks and the tax/fee line.
T05 — The External Affairs Power	The s 51(xxix) branch — treaties, international concern, externality.
T06 — The Executive Power of the Commonwealth	The s 61 + s 51(xxxix) nationhood fallback.
T07 — Inconsistency (s 109) and Intergovernmental Immunities	The s 109 tree (§6.3) and the <i>Melbourne Corporation</i> limb.
T08 — Constitutional Rights and Freedoms	The limitation inventory — s 51(xxxi), s 80, s 116, s 117, implied freedom.
T09 — The Separation of Judicial Power	Develops the Ch III limbs — <i>Boilermakers</i> (Cth), <i>Kable</i> (State/Territory).
T11 — Revision and Cross-Topic Synthesis	Reassembles the trees into a whole-of-unit synthesis.

10. Quick Reference Card

The method in three moves.

MOVE	QUESTION TO ASK	KEY AUTHORITY
1 — Power	Is the law supported by a source? (ss 51/52; s 61 + s 51(xxxix); s 96; s 81)	<i>Grain Pool</i> ; <i>Pape</i>
2 — Limit	Does it offend a limit? (s 51(xxxi); s 80/116/117; implied freedom; <i>Melbourne Corporation</i> ; Ch III)	<i>Lange</i> ; <i>McCloy</i>
3 — Sever	Does the remainder still function without the invalid part?	<i>Air Caledonie</i>

Sources of Commonwealth power (stage one).

SOURCE	TRIGGER	LEADING CASE
s 51 / s 52 head	subject-matter connection	<i>Grain Pool</i>
purposive power (defence, s 51(vi))	reasonably appropriate and adapted to the end	<i>Thomas v Mowbray</i>
incidental (s 51(xxxix))	reasonably necessary/appropriate to the core	<i>Leask</i>
s 61 + s 51(xxxix) nationhood	only national action can meet the need	<i>Pape</i>
s 96 grant	conditional grant of assistance to a State	<i>Federal Aid Roads Case</i>
s 81 appropriation	earmarking only — plus a substantive spending source	<i>Pharmaceutical Benefits Case</i>

Limits (stage two).

LIMIT	ONE-LINE TEST	LEADING CASE
s 51(xxxi)	acquisition of property requires just terms	<i>JT International</i>
s 80	trial on indictment must be by jury; cannot be waived	<i>Brown</i>
s 117	substance test: disability on an out-of-State resident	<i>Street</i>
implied freedom	effective burden, then structured proportionality	<i>Lange; McCloy</i>
<i>Melbourne Corporation</i>	no significant impairment of State capacity (territories unprotected)	<i>Clarke</i>
Ch III (Cth)	the two <i>Boilermakers</i> limbs	<i>Boilermakers</i>
<i>Kable</i> (State/Territory)	no function incompatible with institutional integrity	<i>Kable</i>

Section 109 — the three branches.

BRANCH	QUESTION	LEADING CASE
Direct — obedience	Is it impossible to obey both laws at once?	<i>Ex parte Daniell</i>
Direct — rights	Does the State law alter, impair or detract, significantly?	<i>Clyde Engineering; Jemena</i>
Indirect — field	Did the Cth intend a complete statement, and does the State law enter it?	<i>Kakariki Case; Wenn</i>
Consequence	Cth prevails; State law inoperative to the extent	<i>Metwally</i>

Word budget (scale your writing to the marks; ~33 words per mark as a working heuristic).

MARKS	WORD CEILING
5	~165 (one tight paragraph)
15	~500
30	~1,000
60 (whole paper)	~2,000 — plan the allocation before writing

11. References

Legislation

Australian Constitution ss 51, 51(vi), 51(xx), 51(xxix), 51(xxxi), 51(xxxix), 52, 57, 61, 80, 81, 96, 107, 109, 116, 117, 122, 128.

Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 18.

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).

Cases

Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth (1988) 165 CLR 462.

Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 ('*Engineers*').

Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237 ('*Pharmaceutical Benefits Case*').

Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185.

Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.

Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29.

Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477.

Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171.

Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541.

Clarke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 240 CLR 272.

Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466.

Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1.

Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty Ltd (in liq) (1962) 108 CLR 372.

Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 ('*Tasmanian Dam Case*').

Dickson v The Queen (2010) 241 CLR 491.

Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472.

Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1965) 114 CLR 1.

Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575.

Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth (2000) 202 CLR 479.

Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348.

Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57.

Hume v Palmer (1926) 38 CLR 441.

ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140.

Jemena Asset Management (3) Pty Ltd v Coinvest Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 508.

JT International SA v Commonwealth (2012) 250 CLR 1.

Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309.

Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.

Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168.

Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1.

Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.

Leask v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 579.

Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579.

McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178.

Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31.

Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261.

Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1.

New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337 ('*Seas and Submerged Lands Case*').

New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 ('*Work Choices Case*').

Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513.

North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146.

Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1.

R v Federal Court of Australia; Ex parte WA National Football League (1979) 143 CLR 190.

R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 ('*Boilermakers*').

R v Licensing Court of Brisbane; Ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 CLR 23.

R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121.

Re F; Ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376.

Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410.

South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1.

Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461.

Tajjour v New South Wales (2014) 254 CLR 508.

Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307.

Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1.

University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447.

Victoria v Commonwealth (1926) 38 CLR 399 ('*Federal Aid Roads Case*').

Victoria v Commonwealth (1937) 58 CLR 618 ('*Kakariki Case*').

Victoria v Commonwealth (1957) 99 CLR 575 ('*Second Uniform Tax Case*').

Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 ('*Industrial Relations Act Case*').

Wenn v Attorney-General (Vic) (1948) 77 CLR 84.

Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1.

Secondary Sources

George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew Lynch, *Blackshield and Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary and Materials* (Federation Press, 7th ed, 2018).

Leslie Zines, *The High Court and the Constitution* (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2008).

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Footnotes

1. *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth* (2000) 202 CLR 479.
2. Australian Constitution s 109.
3. Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi).
4. Australian Constitution s 96.
5. Australian Constitution ss 51, 52.
6. *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (1997) 189 CLR 520.

7. *Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth* (1988) 165 CLR 462.
8. *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (n 6).
9. *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth* (n 1).
10. *Fairfax v Federal Commissioner of Taxation* (1965) 114 CLR 1.
11. *Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association* (1908) 6 CLR 309.
12. *Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1976) 136 CLR 1.
13. *Leask v Commonwealth* (1996) 187 CLR 579.
14. *Thomas v Mowbray* (2007) 233 CLR 307.
15. Australian Constitution s 51(xxxix).
16. *Pape v Commissioner of Taxation* (2009) 238 CLR 1.
17. *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (n 6).
18. Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi).
19. Australian Constitution ss 80, 116, 117.
20. *McCloy v New South Wales* (2015) 257 CLR 178.
21. *Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth* (1947) 74 CLR 31.
22. *Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)* (1996) 189 CLR 51.
23. *Coleman v Power* (2004) 220 CLR 1.
24. An illustrative cap; words beyond a stated limit are typically disregarded, and headings and references usually count.
25. Illustrative figures, apportioning words in proportion to marks per part.
26. Marks reward application and value judgment, not reproducing the test.
27. Australian Constitution s 109.
28. *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth* (n 1).
29. Australian Constitution ss 51, 52.
30. *Thomas v Mowbray* (n 14).
31. *Pape v Commissioner of Taxation* (n 16).
32. *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth* (1951) 83 CLR 1.
33. *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (n 6).
34. Australian Constitution ss 57, 128.
35. *Air Caledonie International v Commonwealth* (n 7).
36. Australian Constitution s 107.
37. Australian Constitution s 117.
38. *Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)* (n 22).

39. *Commonwealth v Cigamatic Pty Ltd (in liq)* (1962) 108 CLR 372.
40. *Constitution Act 1975* (Vic) s 18.
41. Australian Constitution s 109.
42. *University of Wollongong v Metwally* (1984) 158 CLR 447.
43. *Dickson v The Queen* (2010) 241 CLR 491.
44. *R v Licensing Court of Brisbane; Ex parte Daniell* (1920) 28 CLR 23.
45. *Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn* (1926) 37 CLR 466.
46. *Victoria v Commonwealth* (1937) 58 CLR 618 ('*Kakariki Case*').
47. *Wenn v Attorney-General (Vic)* (1948) 77 CLR 84.
48. *University of Wollongong v Metwally* (n 42).
49. *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth* (n 1).
50. *Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (n 12).
51. *Pape v Commissioner of Taxation* (n 16).
52. *Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel* (1944) 68 CLR 261.
53. *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth* (n 1).
54. Australian Constitution s 109.
55. *R v Licensing Court of Brisbane; Ex parte Daniell* (n 44).
56. *Wenn v Attorney-General (Vic)* (n 47).
57. *University of Wollongong v Metwally* (n 42).
58. Australian Constitution s 109.
59. *McCloy v New South Wales* (n 20).
60. *Grain Pool of Western Australia v Commonwealth* (n 1).
61. *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (n 6).
62. *Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (n 12).
63. *Pape v Commissioner of Taxation* (n 16).
64. *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth* (n 32).
65. *Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (n 6).
66. *ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (2009) 240 CLR 140.
67. *Barton v Commonwealth* (1974) 131 CLR 477.
68. *Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)* (n 22).
69. *Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth* (n 21).

To1 — Australian Constitutionalism: Federation, Interpretation and Constitutional Change

1. Overview

Topic 1 supplies the conceptual vocabulary every later topic assumes a student already possesses. It is rarely tested as a discrete problem question, but its ideas — federalism, responsible and representative government, the rule of law, the destruction of the reserved powers doctrine in *Engineers*, and the connotation/denotation method of interpretation — are the load-bearing premises beneath the implied freedom, the characterisation method, and every s 109 or *Melbourne Corporation* analysis that follows. A student who cannot trace the implied freedom to ss 7, 24, 64 and 128, or state the *Engineers* method in one sentence, will lose marks later for failing to establish the premise before applying the rule.

 **Reading Guide:** Master the definitions in §2 and the provisions table in §3 first — know what ss 51, 52, 61, 64, 107, 109 and 128 each do without looking them up. On deep revision, work through the *Engineers* summary and the connotation/denotation logic in §6 until the distinction between permissible denotational change and impermissible connotational change is automatic. Engage critically with the legalism-versus-purposivism debate in §5.10, particularly the cost of literalism to the federal balance after *Work Choices*.

 **Exam Weight:** Topic 1 is rarely tested as a standalone question — it underpins every characterisation and implied-freedom problem in the foundations scope (Topics 1–4) and recurs as a method question in later problem answers — but its principles are the source of two recurring archetypes: deriving the implied freedom from ss 7, 24, 64 and 128, and identifying which features of a constitutional guarantee are essential (§5.7). Be able to state, in one sentence each, the *Engineers* method and the connotation/denotation distinction.

2. Key Definitions

TERM	DEFINITION	AUTHORITY
Constitution	The fundamental law of the Commonwealth; the primary source of, and limit upon, public power, distributing it between the arms and levels of government.	Australian Constitution covering cl 5.
Federalism	A system dividing public power between a central government and the governments of constituent States or provinces, each retaining its own constitution and organs of government.	Australian Constitution ss 106–107.
Separation of powers	The tripartite division of legislative, executive and judicial power among independent institutions, intended to prevent the concentration of public power and preserve liberty.	Australian Constitution chs I–III; considered fully at T09.
Responsible government	The constitutional convention/rule that the Executive is drawn from, and accountable to, the Parliament, and that supply (money) is controlled by Parliament.	Australian Constitution ss 64, 83.
Representative government	The principle that public power resides in the people and is exercised on their behalf by representatives directly chosen by them.	Australian Constitution ss 7, 24, 128; <i>Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth</i> (1992) 177 CLR 106.
Rule of law	The principle that government is conducted according to law, that all persons are equal before the law, and that no person may be deprived of liberty without an independent court's determination.	Australian Constitution covering cl 5; <i>Case of Proclamations</i> (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; 77 ER 1352.
Parliamentary sovereignty (Diceyan)	The (British) theory that a legislature may make or unmake any law whatsoever, subject to no legal limit — a theory the Commonwealth and State Parliaments do not share.	Contrast Australian Constitution ss 51, 52, 107 (limited/residual grants only).
Judicial review	The power of a court to determine, and if necessary invalidate, legislative or executive action that exceeds constitutional authority.	<i>Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth</i> (1951) 83 CLR 1.
Reserved powers doctrine	The pre-1920 doctrine construing Commonwealth heads of power narrowly so as to protect an assumed residue of State legislative power; destroyed in 1920.	<i>Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd</i> (1920) 28 CLR 129 (' <i>Engineers</i> ').
Legalism	An interpretive method giving constitutional text its natural, full meaning by reference to text and structure alone, without regard to extra-constitutional political or social considerations.	<i>Engineers</i> (1920) 28 CLR 129.
Connotation/denotation	Connotation is the essential, unchanging meaning of a constitutional term fixed at 1900; denotation is the (potentially expanding) class of things to which that meaning applies.	<i>Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW</i> (1908) 6 CLR 469 (' <i>Union Label Case</i> ') (Higgins J).
Manner and form (entrenchment)	A restrictive procedure attached to a legislative power requiring compliance with a special mode (eg absolute majority, referendum) before that power may validly be exercised — considered fully at T02.	<i>Australia Act 1986</i> (Cth) s 6.

3. Constitutional & Legislative Framework

PROVISION	WHAT IT DOES	RELEVANCE
Australian Constitution s 1	Vests Commonwealth legislative power in a Federal Parliament of the Queen, Senate and House of Representatives.	Textual source of Commonwealth legislative power.
Australian Constitution ss 7, 24	Senators and Members "directly chosen by the people".	Textual anchor of representative government; source of the implied freedom (T08).
Australian Constitution s 51 (chapeau)	Confers 39 heads of concurrent legislative power "for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth".	The characterisation workhorse (T03).
Australian Constitution s 52	Confers exclusive Commonwealth power over Commonwealth places, the seat of government and matters the Constitution declares exclusive.	Exclusive power category.
Australian Constitution s 61	Vests the executive power of the Commonwealth in the Queen, exercisable by the Governor-General.	Source of responsible government and the nationhood power (T06).
Australian Constitution s 64	Requires Ministers to be drawn from, and answerable to, Parliament.	Textual anchor of responsible government.
Australian Constitution s 83	Requires an appropriation by law before money may be drawn from the Treasury.	Parliament's control of supply — the mechanism of responsible government.
Australian Constitution s 90	Makes Commonwealth power over customs, excise and bounties exclusive once uniform duties are imposed.	Exclusive power category.
Australian Constitution s 92	Interstate trade, commerce and intercourse "shall be absolutely free".	Cornerstone of the federal economic union.
Australian Constitution s 106	Continues each State's Constitution, subject to the Commonwealth Constitution.	Basis of State constitutional subordination.
Australian Constitution s 107	Preserves State legislative power except as withdrawn or exclusively vested in the Commonwealth.	Residual power category.
Australian Constitution s 109	Commonwealth law prevails over an inconsistent State law, which is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.	Resolves overlap in concurrent power; considered fully at T07.
Australian Constitution s 128	The referendum procedure for constitutional alteration — absolute majority in each House (or deadlock override), then a double majority of electors nationally and in a majority of States.	The sole general mechanism of constitutional change.
<i>Australia Act 1986</i> (Cth) ss 1–3	Terminate the United Kingdom Parliament's power to legislate for Australia (s 1) and free State legislative power from Imperial repugnancy and territorial restrictions (ss 2–3).	Severs the imperial link.
<i>Australia Act 1986</i> (Cth) s 6	Re-enacts the <i>Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865</i> (Imp) s 5 manner and form requirement for State legislation "respecting the constitution, powers or procedure" of a State Parliament.	Considered fully at T02.

The three provisions a student must be able to reproduce or locate instantly are the executive power vesting clause, the inconsistency rule, and the amendment procedure:

Section 61 — Executive power "The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exerciseable by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth."^[1]

Section 109 — Inconsistency of laws "When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid."^[2]

Section 128 — Mode of altering the Constitution (extract) "This Constitution shall not be altered except in the following manner: — The proposed law for the alteration thereof must be passed by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament, and not less than two nor more than six months after its passage through both Houses the proposed law shall be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members of the House of Representatives. ... And if in a majority of the States a majority of the electors voting approve the proposed law, and if a majority of all the electors voting also approve the proposed law, it shall be presented to the Governor-General for the Queen's assent."^[3]

4. Key Cases

CASE	CITATION	PRINCIPLE	EXAM APPLICATION
<i>Prohibitions del Roy</i>	(1607) 12 Co Rep 63; 77 ER 1342 (' <i>Case of Prohibitions</i> ')	Causes are determined by the courts according to the artificial reason and judgment of the law, not by the King personally.	Rule-of-law foundation; used to explain judicial independence as a premise of Ch III (T09).
<i>Case of Proclamations</i>	(1611) 12 Co Rep 74; 77 ER 1352	The Crown cannot create new offences or alter the law by proclamation.	Rule-of-law foundation for the proposition that executive power is confined by law.
<i>Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW</i> (' <i>Union Label Case</i> ')	(1908) 6 CLR 469	Higgins J's connotation/denotation distinction — essential meaning fixed at 1900, denotation may expand.	The interpretive tool for "is this term still open to a new application" questions.
<i>Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association</i>	(1908) 6 CLR 309	O'Connor J: the Constitution is broad and general, intended to apply to varying conditions; lean to the broader interpretation.	Cited whenever a student argues for a generous reading of a head of power.
<i>Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd</i> (' <i>Engineers</i> ')	(1920) 28 CLR 129	Destroys the reserved powers doctrine; Commonwealth heads of power read naturally and given full amplitude.	The starting premise of every characterisation answer (T03).
<i>R v Brislan; Ex parte Williams</i>	(1935) 54 CLR 262	Connotation/denotation in action: "postal, telegraphic, telephonic and other like services" extends to wireless broadcasting.	Model example of permissible denotational expansion.
<i>Cole v Whitfield</i>	(1988) 165 CLR 360	Convention debates and historical materials may identify contemporary meaning and mischief, but not control the text.	The rule for when and how history may be used in argument.
<i>Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth</i>	(1992) 177 CLR 106	Representative government entrenched by ss 7, 24 and 128; sovereign power resides in the people, exercised by elected representatives.	Premise for the implied freedom derivation (T08).
<i>Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet</i>	(2003) 217 CLR 545	Section 6 of the <i>Australia Act</i> is the operative source of binding manner and form.	Forward reference to T02; illustrates the Australia Acts' domestic legal effect.
<i>Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory</i> (' <i>Marriage Equality Case</i> ')	(2013) 250 CLR 441	"Marriage" in s 51(xxi) is not frozen to its 1900 denotation.	Contemporary example of denotational, not connotational, change.

Case Summaries

1. *Case of Proclamations* (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; 77 ER 1352

King James I claimed a prerogative to create new offences by proclamation. The judges held the Crown had no prerogative to change the common law, statute law or custom of the realm by proclamation, and none but that which the law of the land allowed.^[4] This is the earliest authority that executive power is confined by law — the historical premise for sourcing Commonwealth executive action to s 61 or statute (T06).

2. *Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW ('Union Label Case')* (1908) 6 CLR 469

The case concerned whether Commonwealth "workers' trade marks" legislation was supported by a head of power. Higgins J distinguished the *connotation* of a constitutional term — its essential meaning, fixed at 1900 — from its *denotation* — the things it describes, which may expand to capture new instances within that fixed meaning.^[5] This is the foundational interpretive tool for fact patterns involving a technology or practice unknown in 1900.

3. *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd ('Engineers')* (1920) 28 CLR 129

A trade union sought an award against employers including three State instrumentalities, which argued Commonwealth industrial legislation could not bind an agency of the Crown in right of a State, relying on the reserved powers doctrine and implied intergovernmental immunities. The majority rejected both: Commonwealth power was to be given its natural and full meaning, "as plenary and as ample" as the Imperial Parliament could bestow.^[6] Commonwealth laws now bind the States and, reciprocally, State laws bind the Commonwealth, subject to s 109.^[7] *Engineers* is cited in almost every characterisation answer as the starting premise.

4. *Cole v Whitfield* (1988) 165 CLR 360

Tasmanian regulations prescribing minimum crayfish sizes effectively excluded smaller, lawfully-caught South Australian crayfish from the Tasmanian market, raising whether they offended s 92's guarantee that interstate trade "shall be absolutely free". The Court reformulated s 92 as prohibiting discriminatory protectionist burdens on interstate trade, and held that the Convention Debates may identify contemporary meaning and mischief, but cannot *control* the text's meaning.^[8] The case licenses history as an interpretive aid, not a means of overriding the text.

5. *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992) 177 CLR 106

Commonwealth legislation banned broadcasting political advertisements during election periods, subject to limited free-time allocations. The majority held ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 together entrench representative and responsible government in which sovereign power resides in the people, exercised through elected representatives,^[9] that system necessarily implies a freedom to communicate on government and political matters, indispensable to the effective exercise of the ss 7 and 24 choice.^[10] The ban was accordingly invalid. *ACTV* is the canonical authority for deriving the implied freedom.

5. Substantive Content

5.1 The federal compact and the structure of the Constitution

The Australian Constitution is the outcome of a federal compact between six formerly self-governing British colonies, which agreed to unite in "one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth" while each retained its own Constitution and organs of government.^[11] As Gleeson CJ put it, this division of power between central and State governments "is the essence of a federation".^[12] The document blends British traditions (the Crown, responsible government: ss 2, 61) with American ones (federalism, an entrenched text, and, more cautiously, the separation of powers and judicial review).^[13] The founders rejected an entrenched bill of rights, preferring responsible government, the common law and periodic elections (T08). The Constitution is s 9 of an Imperial statute, the *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900* (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12,^[14] organised into eight chapters: Parliament (ss 1–60); the Executive (ss 61–70); the Judicature (ss 71–80), founding the separation of powers considered at T09; Finance and Trade (ss 81–105A) and the States (ss 106–120), which structure the federal economic union; New States (s 121); Miscellaneous (ss 122–125); and Alteration of the Constitution (s 128).

5.2 Responsible government and representative government

Responsible government is the Westminster convention that government is carried out in the Crown's name but conducted in substance by Ministers drawn from, and accountable to, Parliament.^[15] Section 64 requires Ministers to be appointed by the Governor-General and, after a qualifying period, to become a Senator or Member.^[16] Although executive power is formally vested in the Governor-General by s 61, he or she acts on the advice of Ministers who command the confidence of the House.^[17] Control of supply makes this accountability real: by s 83, no money may leave the Treasury except under an appropriation made by law.^[18] Bagehot called responsible government "the efficient secret" of the Westminster system — fusing, rather than separating, executive and legislative power, in contrast to the strict separation attempted in the United States.^[19]

Representative government is the related principle that public power is derived from, and exercised on behalf of, the people through elected representatives. It is anchored in ss 7 and 24 (Senators and Members "directly chosen by the people") and reinforced by s 128, which requires the people's own approval for constitutional change.^[20] As *Australian Capital Television* establishes, representative government is constitutionally entrenched rather than a mere convention, and is the textual source of the implied freedom considered in full at T08.^[21]




Figure 1.1: Deriving the implied freedom from the Constitution's text. The four sections together ground representative and responsible government — the freedom of political communication is the necessary implication of that combined premise (ACTV; Lange).

5.3 The rule of law

The rule of law is implicit throughout the Constitution and given specific expression in covering cl 5, which binds courts, judges and people of every State to the Constitution and Commonwealth laws made under it.^[22] In its classical Diceyan formulation, it requires equality before the law, government action only within lawfully conferred power, and no deprivation of liberty except by an independent court's determination.^[23] Its foundations lie in seventeenth-century struggles between the Crown and the common law courts: the *Case of Prohibitions* held the King could not personally determine legal disputes, since causes were determined "by the artificial reason and judgment of law";^[24] the *Case of Proclamations* ex-

tended this to hold the Crown could not create new offences by proclamation.^[25] These cases underlie the requirement that executive action be sourced to law rather than unconstrained prerogative — developed further at T06.

5.4 The separation of powers: a preview

At the Commonwealth level, the separation of powers has been inferred from the Constitution's structure — Chapter I the Parliament, Chapter II the Executive, Chapter III the Judicature^[26] — but is only partial. Section 64 means the legislature and executive are fused (Ministers must sit in Parliament), while judicial power is strictly separated: it may be exercised only by a court constituted under Ch III, which may perform no function incompatible with judicial power.^[27] This asymmetry is developed fully at T09, including the two-limbed *Boilermakers* principle and its extension to State and Territory courts through the *Kable* line of authority.^[28] No Australian State Constitution recognises a formal separation of powers; State Parliaments may confer judicial functions on non-judicial bodies, though such legislation remains subject to the *Kable* limitation once it touches courts exercising federal jurisdiction.^[29] Every State Parliament nonetheless remains subject to the Commonwealth Constitution by force of ss 106–107.^[30]

5.5 Federalism and the division of legislative power

Federalism divides Australian legislative power into three categories. **Exclusive Commonwealth power:** s 52 (Commonwealth places, seat of government, declared exclusive matters)^[31] and s 90 (customs, excise and bounties, once uniform duties are imposed).^[32] **Concurrent power:** the 39 heads of s 51 — trade and commerce, taxation, defence, corporations, external affairs among them — legislated on by both levels;^[33] a State law may cover the same subject matter unless and until a Commonwealth law occupies the field.^[34] **Residual (State) power:** s 107 continues State power except where withdrawn from, or exclusively vested in, the Commonwealth^[35] — a broad, unenumerated residue, since the s 51 list is not exhaustive.

Where Commonwealth and State laws validly enacted under concurrent power conflict, s 109 resolves it: the Commonwealth law prevails, invalid only to the extent of the inconsistency, whether direct (simultaneous obedience impossible, or rights detracted from) or indirect (the Commonwealth law "covers the field").^[36] Fully examined, with the *Melbourne Corporation* limitation, at T07.

5.6 The reserved powers doctrine and its destruction in *Engineers*

Before 1920, the High Court — several judges having been Convention delegates — construed Commonwealth heads of power narrowly, assuming the Constitution reserved to the States a protected domain Commonwealth grants must not invade.^[37] This reserved powers doctrine, with a companion doctrine of implied intergovernmental immunities (T07), meant identical wording could be read down simply because a broader reading would displace State competence, as in *Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead* (1909) 8 CLR 330.^[38]

Engineers rejected both doctrines: Commonwealth power was to be read with all the generality its words admitted, as "an authority as plenary and as ample ... as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could bestow", unconstrained by any assumption protecting State legislative domain.^[39] Higgins J's warning in the *Union Label Case* — that grants must be identified before asserting a State "residue" — was vindicated: the residue is simply whatever the grants do not reach.^[40] The consequence, evident from *Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd* (1971) 124 CLR 468 to the *Work Choices Case* (2006) 229 CLR 1, has been steady expansion of Commonwealth reach, the only remaining constraints being s 109 and express or implied limitations such as s 51(xxxi), the implied freedom, or *Melbourne Corporation*.^[41]

5.7 Theories of constitutional interpretation

Engineers installed **legalism** as the orthodox method: constitutional text is construed by its ordinary and natural meaning, without regard to politics or consequences.^[42] It remains the default — every characterisation exercise asks whether a law "answers the description" of a head of power.^[43] Legalism was never applied with complete rigidity, however: even Dixon J warned against "pedantic and narrow constructions" and endorsed making implications from text and structure — the separation of powers is one; decades later, so was the implied freedom in *ACTV* and *Nationwide News*.^[44]

Two techniques mediate between literalism and progressivism. **Connotation and denotation:** the essential meaning (connotation) of a term is fixed at 1900, but the things it describes (denotation) may expand to capture new instances within that fixed meaning.^[45] *R v Brislan* held "telephonic ... services" extends to wireless broadcasting,^[46] and the *Marriage Equality Case* held "marriage" is not frozen to its 1900 social arrangement.^[47] **History and the Convention Debates:** *Cole v Whitfield* held these inform but cannot control the text's meaning.^[48] *Jumbunna* reinforces this generosity: the Constitution is "broad and general ... intended to apply to ... varying conditions", so the Court leans to the broader interpretation unless context indicates otherwise.^[49]

5.8 The Australia Acts and the severing of imperial links

Australia's legal independence from the United Kingdom came incrementally. The *Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865* (Imp) imposed a repugnancy doctrine and manner and form requirements on colonial legislation.^[50] The *Statute of Westminster 1931* (UK), adopted domestically in 1942, freed the Commonwealth Parliament from repugnancy but not the States.^[51] The *Australia Act 1986* (Cth) closed that gap: s 1 ends United Kingdom power to legislate for Australia; s 2 confirms State extraterritorial power; s 3 frees States from repugnancy; s 11 abolishes Privy Council appeals.^[52] Section 6 re-enacts the manner and form requirement binding State legislation "respecting the constitution, powers or procedure" of a State Parliament — central to *Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet* (T02).^[53] The *Australia Acts* are generally regarded as the final severing of Australia's residual UK ties, though Australia remains a realm of the Crown.^[54] *Sue v Hill* illustrates the consequence: the United Kingdom is, for s 44(i) purposes, a "foreign power".^[55]

5.9 Constitutional change under s 128

Section 128 is the Constitution's sole general mechanism of amendment.^[56] A proposed law must first pass an absolute majority of each House — or, on persistent disagreement between the Houses, be submitted directly to electors after the s 128 deadlock procedure, an alternative to the s 57 double-dissolution mechanism.^[57] It then goes, two to six months later, to electors in every State, requiring a **double majority**: a majority of all electors nationally, and a majority of electors in a majority of States (at least four of the six).^[58] ACT and Northern Territory electors count towards the national majority but are not a "State" for the State-majority requirement.^[59] Only proposals diminishing a State's proportionate representation or territorial limits require that State's own separate majority.^[60]

Only 8 of 45 referendum proposals since Federation have succeeded.^[61] The 1999 republic referendum and the 2023 Voice referendum both failed nationally and in every State.^[62] The double majority demands geographically dispersed consensus; s 128 requires bipartisan political will merely to *put* a proposal to the people; and referendums lacking bipartisan support tend to fail. Section 128 is not the only lawful route to change: provisions operating "until the Parliament otherwise provides" (eg ss 3, 7, 10, 24, 29–31, 34, 39, 46–8, 65–7, 73, 87, 93, 96–7) may be altered by ordinary legislation under s 51(xxxvi), entirely outside the referendum process — a mechanism students frequently overlook.^[63]

5.10 Critical Perspectives

PERSPECTIVE	SOURCE	ARGUMENT	COUNTER-ARGUMENT
Legalism v purposivism	<i>Engineers</i> ; Dixon J in <i>Australian National Airways</i> (1945) 71 CLR 29	Legalism secures certainty, avoiding judges substituting their own preferences for the framers' words. ^[64]	Textualism removed the only check on Commonwealth power without a replacement, leaving federal balance rebuilt piecemeal through later implications. ^[65]
Federal balance after <i>Work Choices</i>	<i>NSW v Commonwealth</i> (2006) 229 CLR 1	Taken to its endpoint, <i>Engineers</i> lets s 51(xx) reach the entire employment relationship of a corporation, leaving federalism no enforceable limit beyond narrow guarantees. ^[66]	The Court stayed faithful to the text; balance is preserved by non-legal safeguards — the Senate, COAG, s 96 grants, electoral accountability.
Legitimacy of the founding compact	1899–1900 referendums	Approved by an electorate excluding most women and many Aboriginal Australians — a thin mandate for a document never re-ratified.	Universal suffrage, the 1967 referendum, and <i>Roach v Electoral Commissioner</i> 's recognition of near-universal suffrage have broadened that mandate. ^[67]
Judicial review and the "democratic deficit"	<i>ACP v Commonwealth</i> (1951) 83 CLR 1	An unelected Court invalidating Acts of an elected Parliament sits uneasily with responsible government. ^[68]	Judicial review is sourced to the Constitution the people approved under s 128; validity is a legal question committed to the judiciary, not Parliament's say-so. ^[69]

6. Decision Tree / Answer Framework

A dispute engaging Topic 1 principles typically arises as a *premise* inside a larger characterisation, rights or federalism problem, not as a standalone question. The following steps identify and resolve the interpretive issue before the substantive head-of-power or limitation analysis begins.

1. Identify the constitutional term or provision genuinely in dispute. Read the fact pattern for a word whose 1900 meaning is being stretched to a modern instance (a technology, a relationship, an institution), or for a claim that an implication should be drawn from structure rather than text.

2. Classify the dispute.

- If the dispute is about whether a *law* falls within the *scope* of a head of power, this is characterisation (T03) — apply the *Engineers* natural-meaning method and move to that framework.
- If the dispute is about the *meaning of a word or phrase* used in the constitutional text itself, continue with steps 3–5 below.

3. Ask whether the term's meaning may have changed since 1900.

- If there is no serious argument of change, apply the ordinary, plain (legalist) meaning: *Engineers*.
- If change is argued, proceed to step 4.

4. Distinguish connotation from denotation.

- Is the change confined to the *denotation* — new instances falling within an unchanged essential meaning? If so, the ambulatory application is valid: compare *R v Brislan*; *Ex parte Williams* (wireless within "telephonic ... services") and *Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory* ('*Marriage Equality Case*') (same-sex marriage within "marriage").
- Is the change instead to the *connotation* — the essential meaning itself? If so, the Court cannot make the change judicially; only a s 128 referendum can alter the Constitution's essential meaning.

5. At every step, historical materials — including the Convention Debates — may be used as an interpretive aid to identify contemporary meaning and the mischief addressed, but never to control or override the text: *Cole v Whitfield*.
6. Once the term's meaning is settled, test the law or executive act against any applicable implied limitation — representative government and the implied freedom (T08), the federal limitation in *Melbourne Corporation* (T07), or the separation of judicial power (T09) — before concluding on validity.

7. Exam Application

Common Fact Patterns

FACT PATTERN	ISSUE TRIGGERED	KEY AUTHORITY
A law or executive act is challenged on the basis that "nothing in the Constitution says the Commonwealth can't do this"	Whether an implication may be drawn from the text and structure of the Constitution	<i>Engineers</i> (1920) 28 CLR 129; <i>Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth</i> (1945) 71 CLR 29
A constitutional term is applied to a technology, relationship or institution unknown in 1900	Connotation/denotation — is the application within the fixed 1900 meaning?	<i>Union Label Case</i> (1908) 6 CLR 469; <i>R v Brislan; Ex parte Williams</i> (1935) 54 CLR 262; <i>Marriage Equality Case</i> (2013) 250 CLR 441
A party relies on the Convention Debates, or on what the framers "must have intended", to argue for a particular reading	Legitimate but limited use of history in constitutional interpretation	<i>Cole v Whitfield</i> (1988) 165 CLR 360
A student is asked to explain the source of a constitutional implication (eg the implied freedom)	Derivation from ss 7, 24, 64, 128 and representative/responsible government	<i>Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth</i> (1992) 177 CLR 106; <i>Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills</i> (1992) 177 CLR 1
A Commonwealth and a State law appear to cover the same subject matter	Concurrent power, s 109 resolution	Australian Constitution ss 51, 107, 109
A proposal for structural constitutional change is described	Whether s 128 or an ordinary-majority "until Parliament otherwise provides" mechanism applies	Australian Constitution s 128; s 51(xxxvi)

Question Type: "How and on what basis did the High Court derive [a constitutional implication]?"

Approach. State which textual provisions work together, name the case(s) that first drew the implication, and trace the chain from text to implication in two or three sentences before application.

Key points. Identify ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 as textual anchors; name *Australian Capital Television* and *Nationwide News*, decided the same day in 1992; state the chain — sovereign power resides in the people, exercised through elected representatives, so effective choice requires free communication.

Sample paragraph (IRAC).

Issue: the source and basis of the implied freedom of political communication. *Rule:* the Constitution contains no express bill of rights, but ss 7 and 24 require members "directly chosen by the people", s 64 requires Ministers drawn from and accountable to Parliament, and s 128 reserves constitutional change to the people's own vote.^[70] *Application:* in 1992, *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* and *Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills* held that these provisions together entrench representative and responsible government in which sovereign power resides in the people, exercised by elected representatives.^[71] Effective exercise of that choice is indispensable to accountability, which requires freedom to communicate about government and political matters.^[72] *Conclusion:* the freedom is therefore implied from the text and structure of the Constitution as a whole, and operates as a limitation on legislative and executive power rather than as a personal right.

Marker's Eye

Because Topic 1 rarely carries its own marks, its highest value in a problem answer is as a *compressed premise*, not a set-piece essay. State the derivation of representative government or the *Engineers* method in one or two sentences with authority, then move to the operative test actually in issue. Reciting the federation chronology or the full facts of *Engineers* wastes the word budget better spent on application elsewhere.

8. Exam Tips & Traps

✓ Do

- State the *Engineers* method — natural meaning, full amplitude, no protected State residue — in a single sentence before using it as a premise elsewhere.
- Use connotation/denotation precisely: identify whether the disputed application is a new *instance* of an old *meaning* (denotation, permissible) or a claimed new *meaning* (connotation, not judicially achievable).
- Cite *Cole v Whitfield* correctly as permitting history to *inform*, not *control*, meaning.
- Trace the implied freedom to all four provisions — ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 — not just ss 7 and 24.

✗ Don't

- Don't spend words narrating the 1890s Constitutional Conventions or the full nineteenth-century chronology in a problem answer — none of it earns marks unless the question is expressly about interpretive method.
- Don't treat the reserved powers doctrine as still good law — it was destroyed in 1920 and reviving it (even by analogy) in a characterisation answer is a serious error.
- Don't confuse manner and form/entrenchment (T02) with s 128 — they are different mechanisms operating at different levels of government.
- Don't assume s 128 is the only way the constitutional text can be altered — the s 51(xxxvi) "until Parliament otherwise provides" mechanism is a live alternative for a defined class of provisions.

⚠ Watch Out For

- A fact pattern testing whether a modern technology or institution falls within an old head of power is testing connotation/denotation, not characterisation's sufficiency-of-connection test — do not conflate the two frameworks.

- The Australia Acts operate at *both* Commonwealth and State level; do not assume s 6 (manner and form) is the only relevant provision — ss 1, 2, 3 and 11 do separate, equally examinable work.
- Territory electors count towards the national majority under s 128 but never count as a "State" for the State-majority requirement — a frequently confused point.

9. Connections to Other Topics

TOPIC	CONNECTION
T02 (Manner and Form)	Develops s 128 mechanics and the Australia Act s 6 doctrine.
T03 (Characterisation)	Applies the <i>Engineers</i> natural - meaning method.
T04 (Financial Powers)	Applies the concurrent/exclusive framework to taxation and grants.
T05 (External Affairs)	Uses the <i>Engineers</i> method for the breadth of s 51(xxix).
T06 (Executive Power)	Develops s 61 into the nationhood power.
T07 (Inconsistency)	Fully develops s 109 and <i>Melbourne Corporation</i> .
T08 (Rights and Freedoms)	Builds the implied freedom from §5.2.
T09 (Judicial Power)	Fully develops separation of powers and <i>Kable</i> .
T11 (Synthesis)	Consolidates Topic 1's principles with the doctrines they underpin.

10. Quick Reference Card

Sources of Australian constitutional law

SOURCE	EFFECT
<i>Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900</i> (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12, s 9	The Constitution itself.
<i>Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865</i> (Imp)	Historical source of the repugnancy doctrine and manner and form (s 5), now re-enacted by <i>Australia Act 1986</i> (Cth) s 6.
<i>Statute of Westminster 1931</i> (UK); <i>Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1942</i> (Cth)	Freed the Commonwealth (not the States) from repugnancy and paramount UK legislative force.
<i>Australia Act 1986</i> (Cth)	Completed legal independence: severed remaining UK legislative power (s 1), freed State legislative power from Imperial repugnancy restrictions (s 3) and confirmed its extraterritorial operation (s 2), abolished Privy Council appeals (s 11), confirmed State manner and form (s 6).
High Court decisions	Authoritative interpretation of the Constitution — the "living" source that adapts text to changed conditions.

Division of legislative power

CATEGORY	SOURCE	EXAMPLE
Exclusive Commonwealth	ss 52, 90	Commonwealth places; customs and excise.
Concurrent	s 51 (39 heads)	Trade and commerce, taxation, corporations, external affairs.
Residual (State)	s 107	Everything not withdrawn from or exclusively vested in the Commonwealth.
Resolution of conflict	s 109	Commonwealth law prevails; inconsistent State law invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

Interpretive method at a glance

RULE	CASE
Natural, full meaning; no protected State residue	<i>Engineers</i> (1920) 28 CLR 129
Lean to the broader interpretation	<i>Jumbunna</i> (1908) 6 CLR 309
Connotation fixed at 1900; denotation may expand	<i>Union Label Case</i> (1908) 6 CLR 469
History informs, does not control, meaning	<i>Cole v Whitfield</i> (1988) 165 CLR 360
Representative government entrenched by ss 7, 24, 64, 128	<i>ACTV</i> (1992) 177 CLR 106

Section 128 in one line: absolute majority each House (or deadlock override) → 2–6 months → electors in every State vote → double majority (national + majority of States) → Governor-General assent. 8 of 45 proposals have succeeded.

11. References

Legislation

- *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900* (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12, s 9.
- *Australia Act 1986* (Cth).
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Cases

- *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd* (1920) 28 CLR 129.
- *Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW* (1908) 6 CLR 469.
- *Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet* (2003) 217 CLR 545.
- *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992) 177 CLR 106.
- *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth* (1951) 83 CLR 1.
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- *Case of Proclamations* (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; 77 ER 1352.
- *Cole v Whitfield* (1988) 165 CLR 360.
- *Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory* (2013) 250 CLR 441.

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- A V Dicey, *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution* (Macmillan, 8th ed, 1915).

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Footnotes

1. Australian Constitution s 61.
2. Australian Constitution s 109.
3. Australian Constitution s 128.
4. *Case of Proclamations* (1611) 12 Co Rep 74; 77 ER 1352.
5. *Attorney-General (NSW) v Brewery Employees Union of NSW* (1908) 6 CLR 469 (Higgins J).
6. *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd* (1920) 28 CLR 129.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Cole v Whitfield* (1988) 165 CLR 360.
9. *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992) 177 CLR 106.
10. *Ibid*; *Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills* (1992) 177 CLR 1.
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12. Chief Justice Murray Gleeson, 'Aspects of the Commonwealth Constitution—Part I' in *The Rule of Law and the Constitution* (2000) 40.
13. Lindsay (n 11) 2–3.

14. *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900* (Imp) 63 & 64 Vict, c 12, s 9.
15. Keven Booker, Arthur Glass and Robert Watt, *Federal Constitutional Law* (2nd ed, 1998) 14.
16. Australian Constitution s 64.
17. Australian Constitution s 61.
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19. Booker, Glass and Watt (n 15) 14.
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27. *R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia* (1956) 94 CLR 254.
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36. Australian Constitution s 109.
37. *Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead* (1909) 8 CLR 330.
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41. *New South Wales v Commonwealth* (2006) 229 CLR 1; *Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth* (1947) 74 CLR 31.
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58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
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61. Australian Constitution s 128.
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63. Australian Constitution s 51(xxxvi).
64. *Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd* (1920) 28 CLR 129.
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68. *Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth* (1951) 83 CLR 1.
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70. Australian Constitution ss 7, 24, 64, 128.
71. *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992) 177 CLR 106; *Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills* (1992) 177 CLR 1.
72. *Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth* (1992) 177 CLR 106.



Sample Preview

This is a preview of the complete study guide.

The full edition contains all **11 topics** across **223 pages**.

TOPICS INCLUDED IN THE FULL EDITION:

1. T00 — The Constitutional Method: Issue-Spotting and Answer Frameworks
2. T01 — Australian Constitutionalism: Federation, Interpretation and Constitutional Change
3. T02 — Parliament, Legislative Procedures and Manner and Form
4. T03 — Characterisation of Commonwealth Laws
5. T04 — Financial and Economic Powers
6. T05 — The External Affairs Power
7. T06 — The Executive Power of the Commonwealth
8. T07 — Inconsistency (s 109) and Intergovernmental Immunities
9. T08 — Constitutional Rights and Freedoms
10. T09 — The Separation of Judicial Power
11. T11 — Revision and Cross-Topic Synthesis