6.1.1.1. S180 – Duty of care and diligence

• Can also be found in 'general law negligence cases' (company can take action) and 'contract of employment' for executive directors and other officers.

	A diverter an atten officer brocches this duty if they are "realized."	Cases
Who owed duty?	A <u>director</u> or <u>other officer</u> breaches this duty if they are "negligent"	
Modern standard of care	S180(1) \rightarrow Reasonable person (objective) test regarding the standard of care required of director/officer X.	
	Director/officer X <u>breached</u> modern standard of care (reasonable person test) outlined in s180(1) because:	
	+ a <i>reasonable</i> person + doing the job as (title) e.g. CEO, CFO, executive directors, non-executive	
	+ in X's company → circumstances e.g. financially struggling in bad situation + would exercise (e.g. would have read FS carefully) but X has not done so	
	***Separately discuss for executive & non-executive directors since different positions and thus different levels of care required!!!	
Minimum standards	All directors (executive & non-executive) must have basic understanding of the	Daniels v AWA Ltd → midd
(even for directors in name & do nothing)	business of the company and be aware of its financial status.	managers not follow constitution an exceed authority (internal guideline
	Director X (executive and non-executive) breached minimum standards required of directors (<i>Daniels v AWA Ltd</i>) because X failed to:	→ who is allowed to do what) and us the co's cash to invest in highly risk
	+ obtain a basic understanding of their company's business e.g. risks	securities \rightarrow financial trouble \rightarrow co
	+ keep informed about and monitor the company's activities e.g. s198A[RR] -	sued auditors for not discoverin
	general power of management	middle managers were not followin
	+ regularly attend board meetings - general monitoring of company affairs, no need for detailed inspection of day-to-day activities (diligence)	guidelines BUT auditors sued director for not monitoring middle manage
	+ monitor the co.'s financial position/ status - review financial statements	properly.
Are some people	+ Directors with special skills are held to the standard of a person professing to have	ASIC v Vines – CFO of company
expected a higher level of care?	those skills e.g. CPA qualified \rightarrow expected to be at CPA standard + The more you are involved, the more is expected of you e.g. executive directors.	expect must have identifiab specialised skills of that position
		actions compared against what
	However, the standard of care expected of each director may be different depending on their involvement in mgmt. and special skills (<i>ASIC v Vines</i>). This difference in expected standard of care will affect the extent of punishments each	reasonably competent CFO wou have done
	 director is subject to. Executive directors (including [director's name]) would be expected higher standard of care than non-executive directors. 	
	 As an <u>executive director and CEO</u>, Fred is held to a higher standard of care than 	
	other executive and non-executive since he is more involved in the co's daily running, subject him to higher level of punishment if this duty is held breached.	
	- Meanwhile, given Frank is a CPA which enables him to have better	
	understanding of the company's financial status, he will be held at higher level of care than other non-executive directors	
Are there defences	of care than other <u>non-executive directors</u> . Delegation: s190	***e.g. the delegate is a proper
available?	+ s198D : Directors may <u>delegate</u> any of their powers (s198A[RR] general mgmt.) to	appointed person but disappearin
	any person, unless constitution restricts delegation.	without explanation for a period
Delegation: s190	+ If delegate is negligent, director will be liable <u>unless</u> s190 satisfied.	time, drinking heavily, fail the degree
Reliance on info: s189	• s190(1) If directors delegate power under s198D, a <u>director</u> is responsible for the exercise of the power by the delegate as if the power had been exercised	→ the delegate is not reliable ar competent.
Business Judgement	 by directors themselves → can be delegated by Board but <u>each director is liable</u> s190(2) A director is not responsible under subsection (1) if: 	
rule: s180(2)	 s190(2) A director is not responsible direct subsection (1) n. s190(2)(a) the director believed on reasonable grounds at all times that 	
. ,	the delegate would exercise the power in <i>conformity</i> with the <i>duties</i>	
	imposed on directors by this Act and the company's constitution; and	
	s190(2)(b) the director believed:	
	(i) on <u>reasonable grounds;</u> <mark>and</mark> (ii) in <u>good faith</u> ; <mark>and</mark>	
	(iii) after making <u>proper inquiry</u> if the circumstances indicated the need	
	for inquiry;	
	that the delegate was <i>reliable</i> and <i>competent</i> in relation to power delegated.	

	 Directors may make a defence under s190 delegation. + Because there is no constitution restriction, the director/ Board has delegated the power to [what matters] to [whom] under s198D. + If delegate is negligent, director will be liable (s190(1)) <u>unless</u> s190(2) satisfied. + s190(2)(a) passed because there are reasonable grounds for the director to believe at all times the delegate will <i>exercise the power in conformity with the duties imposed on directors</i> by Act and constitution. The facts suggest the delegate is careful and has no evil motives. + However, s190(2)(b) failed. While director believe in good faith s190(2)(b) (ii) <i>the delegate is reliable and competent</i> in relation to the power delegated, there are no reasonable grounds s190(2)(b) (i) because he/she (experience, expertise, attitude, knowledge) 	
	 The director also does not make proper inquiry s190(2)(b) (iii) Reliance on information: s189 \$189 (a) When a director relies on information (e.g. reports) provided by (i) employees (the director believes on reasonable grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to the matters concerned) (ii) professional advisers or experts (in relation to matters the director believes on reasonable grounds to be within the person's professional or expert competence) (iii) other director or officer (e.g. CEO, CFO) in relation to matters within the director's or officer's authority (iv) board committee (committee of directors) on which the director did not serve in relation to matters within the committee's authority \$189 (b) the reliance was made: (i) in good faith (i.e. honest, not evil) and (ii) after making an independent assessment of the info or advice, having regard to the director's knowledge of the firm (structure and operations) 	ASIC v Healey → PWC report was wrong and director did not read and assess it properly or ask any questions (no need to get 3 rd party opinion). Is the information reasonable to rely on? E.g. timely info (not 20 years ago), from whom (expert), source (internet or paper)
	 Directors may make a defence under S189. + The directors <u>rely on information</u> provided by <u>professional experts</u> (WPC). Since WPC is one of the largest accounting firms, director can <u>believe on reasonable</u> <u>grounds this matter (preparing financial report) is within WPC's professional or expert competence</u> (s189(a)(ii)). + This reliance on information was made in good faith (s189(b)(i)), How? because nothing on the facts suggest evil motive. + But s189(b)(ii) failed because the directors have not made an independent assessment of the information. How? They did not read and assess the financial statements closely to realize those significant errors and omissions. (ASIC v Healey) Business Judgement rule: s180(2) 	ASIC v Rich
	 business buggenient rule. stool(2) + properly made decisions end badly e.g. open new product line, open a new division overseas, expand the business, buy back shares, issue shares, issue debt, etc. + s180(2): Director/officer is taken to meet statutory (s180(1)) and general law duties of care in connection with a business judgment if: (a) good faith and for a proper purpose (i.e. good for the co.) and (b) no material personal interest in subject matter of judgment e.g. NOT expand the business and buy land from the director and (c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate i.e. market research, careful investigation, proposal and (d) rationally believe the judgment is in the best interests of the company → 'rational' unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in their position would hold 	Reasonableness of the belief (c) should be assessed by reference to: + the importance of the business judgement to be made + time available for obtaining info + costs related to obtaining info + director's or officer's confidence in those exploring the matters + state of the company's business at that time and the nature of competing demands on board's attention + Whether or not material info is reasonably available to the director
Who can enforce the duty? What remedies	Directors may make a defence under S180(2). + A business judgment rule has been made to [] + Is this made in accordance with s180(2)? Discuss each point separately. The punishments imposed on each director will <u>depend</u> on the standard of care expected from them. Directors who are held at higher standards (e.g. [name]) will	
are available?	 be punished more heavily. 1. Civil penalty actions ASIC Make a declaration of contravention: s 1317E Order a pecuniary penalty up to \$200,000: s 1317G 	

•	 Disqualify the directors for an appropriate period: s 206C Order compensation be paid to company: s 1317H. Company (only compensation)
2.	General law duties
•	Company
	Injunction
	Compensation/damages
	Account of profits
	Rescission of contract
	Constructive trust
	Directors will make decision that the company will sue a director for a breach of
	uty. But unlikely directors will sue themselves.
	Member derivative action to enforce a right belonging to the company. (Part
2F	1A) i.e. duties owed to company, NOT members.