1.1 DUTY OF CARE

Intro	 Directors and officers are subject to the duty of care under s 180(1)¹ Here, the following may be breaches of the duty → list here specific conduct that may constitute a breach on the facts Given that the business judgment rule in s 180 (2) provides a complete shield to negligence claims at both general law and statute, it will be dealt with first. 		
Remember here –			
	 ⇒ All of the following requirements must be met before this can be used as a defence ⇒ The onus is on the defendant director to establish evidence to support each element of the business judgment rule defence [ASIC v Rich]² 		
	Main defence: Business judgement Rule ³		
equivalent duties at cor (a) make the judgr (b) do not have ma (c) inform themse	other officer who makes a business judgment is taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1) and their mmon law and in equity, in respect of the judgment if they: ment in good faith for a proper purpose ; and aterial interest in the subject matter of the judgment; and elves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and eve that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation		
1. Business	"Any decision to take or not take action in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the		
judgment	corporation"		
Was there a decision made?	 Requires a conscious decision → the director or officer must have turned their mind to the matter [Rich] Therefore 'oversight' duties including duties to monitor the co's affairs and policies and to maintain familiarity with the financial position of the company are NOT protected⁴ Explanatory memo: 'involves decision making about the ordinary business 		

² In this sense \rightarrow if there is not enough info – suggest on the facts that you require more information if the director is to establish a defence – given that the onus is on the defendant director

³ *the belief that the judgment is in the best interests of a corporation is a **rational one** – unless the belief is one that NO reasonable person in their position would hold

⁴ This becomes contentious for **non executive** directors \rightarrow as part of their responsibilities will be oversight and monitoring

	 a decision relating to compliance with the requirements of the
	Corporations Act [ASIC v Fortescue Metal Group]
2(a) Good faith	 Look if they breached s 181
and proper	 Have they acted for a proper purpose?
purpose	 In relation to the good faith requirement (which is usually related to the best
puipose	\rightarrow interests of the corporation) \rightarrow you instead just consider whether the
Was the judgement	defendant acted honestly
made in good faith	
for a proper	
purpose?	
2b) Material	 Adler: had a material personal interest $ightarrow$ his connection with the company
interest in the	that the loan funds were used to purchase and in increasing HIH's share price
subject matter	 BUT \rightarrow personal interest in achieving certain purposes may be different to
	the subject matter
	\circ In Rich $ ightarrow$ the defendants personal interests as shareholders and
	directors were not material personal interest in the subject matter of
	the business judgment – which was decisions not to pay certain
	creditors in accordance with strict contractual terms and decisions to
	accumulate cash to cover the claims of these creditors
3. Informing	 <u>Subjective test:</u> did the director/officer take steps to the extent they
themselves	reasonably believed to be appropriate? [Rich] ⁵
	 Relevant factors [Rich]
Did they inform	 The importance of the business judgment to be made;
themselves about	 The time available for obtaining information;
the subject matter	 The costs related to obtaining information;
of the judgment – to the extent they	 The director's or officer's confidence in those exploring the matter;
reasonably believe	 The state of the company's business at the time and the nature of
to be appropriate?	competing demands on the board's attention; and
	 Whether or not material information is reasonably available to the
	director
	 Adler: seems to be a suggestion that obtaining proper independent advice
	obtained on behalf of HIH (where the unsecure loan was obtained from) would
	be adequate to meet this criteria
4. Company's best	 THIS IS DETERMINED SUBJECTIVELY [Rich]⁶
interests	\circ The requirement is met if the defendant believed that his or her
S. 1.1	judgment was in the best interests of the corporation; and
Did they rationally	 The belief was supported by a reasoning process sufficient to warrant
believe that the judgment was in the	describing it as a rational belief;
best interest of the	 Whether or not the reasoning process is objectively a convincing one
corporation?	

⁵ i.e. even if the director was not aware of available information material to the decision, if he **reasonably believed** that he had taken appropriate steps on the decision-making occasion to inform himself about the subject matter – the protection may be available

⁶ Remember the broader policy here -> the reluctance of courts to review business judgments of directors and to substitute their own judgment on the merits

Requirements met \rightarrow defence is made out Requirements not met \rightarrow s 180(1) applies – go on to that analysis now

Duty of care (s18	Duty of care (s180 (1))				
S180 (1)	s180 (1): a director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they:				
	 (a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation's circumstances; and (b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation as, the director or officer 				
Objective test	 Ask what an ordinary person, with the knowledge and experience of the defendant might be expected to have done in the circumstances if he or she was acting on their behalf [Permanent Building Society – Adler] 				
Taking into account the company's circumstances	 [Maxwell]: the circumstances of the company are relevant to determining breach: <u>Type of company</u> <u>Public or private?</u> <u>Company's constitution?</u> <u>Distribution of decision-making in the company</u> <u>Management is by directors</u> — unless replaced [198A – is a replaceable rule] <u>Size and nature of the company's business</u> Large enterprise – the directors role involves more oversight/monitoring rather than day to day management <u>Smaller businesses</u> – likely that the directors are directly running the business themselves [Daniels v Anderson]: exact nature of the obligation will vary according to size and complexity of the company; the larger and more complex the company is – the broader the level of monitoring <u>Membership of the board</u> <u>Director's position and responsibilities [discussed below]</u> here ask – what were the responsibilities actually carried out by the director/officer? If it doesn't really say on the facts – look at directors responsibilities in the act – remember it's a replaceable rule <u>Director's experience and skills [discussed below]</u> <u>Terms on which the Director has been appointed</u> <u>Any other circumstances of the specific case</u> Transaction outside the general course of the company's business (and so the company has little expertise in the area) – can give rise to a heightened duty of care to scrutinize the transaction [Permanent Building Society] 				
	 <u>Can also look to the distribution of responsibilities</u>: between directors and employees and the competence of management/advisors [Macdonald] 				
Standard of care	Starting point:⇒ Bare minimum standard for all directors → 				

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	<u>Daniels v</u>	 Directors can not remain ignorant about affairs or take a
	<u>Anderson</u>	passive interest in decisions made by the board
		\circ They can not be financially illiterate – they are expected at
	[discussed	the least – to be able to read and understand key financial
	in Adler]	statements such as the profit loss account and balance
		sheet
		\Rightarrow ADLER:
		 A director should become familiar with the fundamentals
		of the business in which the corporation is engaged;
		 A director is under a continuing obligation to keep
		informed about the activities of the corporation;
		A director should maintain familiarity with the financial status of the
		corporation by a regular review of financial statements
	ASIC v Rich	\Rightarrow Opened the door to a requirement of sophistication for executive
		directors
		\Rightarrow Standard:
		You must understand the nature and extent of your company's financial
		performance – regardless of how sophisticated you may be/your
		background/level of knowledge
	<u>ASIC v</u>	\Rightarrow A heightened requirement of duty based on the expertise of the
	<u>Vines</u>	particular directors $ ightarrow$ here vine was the CFO and the other two
		involved were chartered insurers with very high technical
		background
		May not be a universal standard applicable to all directors – but only to
		persons who are well qualified and well experienced
	ASIC v	⇒ Heighted requirement for ALL directors
	Macdonald	It is no longer sufficient to say directors who have a general level of
		understanding is sufficient
	ASIC v	\Rightarrow If directors see any errors or issues with a financial statement – they must
		make further enquiries if matters revealed in these financial statements
	<u>Healy</u>	·
		call for such enquiries \rightarrow i.e. they must be both financially literate in a way to recognize issues or errors
		way to recognize issues or errors ⇒ Involved non-executive director with extensive experience in corporate
		\rightarrow involved hon-executive director with extensive experience in corporate finance and accounting
Specific	1. Confli	ct of interest
circumstances		Where a contract has a conflict of interest between interest and duty – they
		must exercise special vigilance [Adler]
	2. Exper	
		If appointed for a special skill – they cannot shut their eyes to the other areas of
		the business [Ford]
	b.	Examples:
		 [Adler]: director was highly experienced and was a senior partner of a leading accounting firm
		ii. [Healey]: non-executive directors who had extensive experience in
		corporate finance and accounting
		iii. [Rich]: was a chartered accountant and had experience in finance and
		the court held that he owed a higher duty relating to financial matters
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⁷ Remember that this probably extends the duty \rightarrow they must be both financially literate in a way to recognize issues or errors

	A director is not responsible if:
	A director is not responsible if:
	 a. The director believed on reasonable grounds at all times that the delegate would exercise the power in conformity with the duties imposed on directors of the company by this Act and the co's constitution; and
	b. The director believed:
	i. On reasonable grounds; and
	ii. In good faith; and
	iii. After making proper inquiry if the circumstances indicated the need for inquiry;
	That the delegate was reliable and competent in relation to the power delegated
	Was reliance reasonable? [Adler]
	 Was the power one able to be properly delegated?
	 Did the defendant know/should have known of facts that would deny reliance?
	 What was the relationship between the director and the delegate?
	 What was the nature of the subject matter and the risks involved?
	What sort of inquiries did the defendant make?
Reliance	Director is not responsible if they rely on information, or professional or expert advice given or
S 189	prepared by:
	 <u>An employee –</u> whom the director believes on reasonable grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to the matters concerned [189 (a)(i)]
	 <u>A professional adviser or expert</u> – whom the director believes on reasonable grounds to be reliable and competent in relation to the matters concerned [189 (a)(ii)]
	 <u>Another director or officer</u> - in relation to matters within the director or officers authority [189 (a)(iii); or
	 <u>A committee of directors – on which the director did not serve in relation to the matters</u> within the committee's authority [189 (a) (iv)]
	Requirements for delegation:
	• The reliance must have been made [189 (b) (i-ii):
	 In good faith; and
	 After making an independent assessment of the information or advice – having regard to the director's knowledge of the corporation and the complexity of the structure and experimentations of the comparation
	 the structure and operations of the corporation Then → the directors reliance on the information or advice is taken to be reasonable
	• Then \rightarrow the directors reliance on the information of advice is taken to be reasonable unless the contrary is proved
Conclude:	
	Sanctions
Civil	Civil penalty provision – s 1317E
	 D may be subject to a disgualification order (s206C); or
	 A pecuniary order up to \$200k (s1317G) for each breach upon a court's declaration of contravention
Criminal	n/a
Similar	170