

WEEK 8: Express Terms

Incorporation

1. Signature

When a document known to contain contractual terms is signed, then the party signing is bound (*Toll v Alpharpharm, L'Estrange v Graucob*)

It is immaterial whether he has read the document or not (*Toll v Alpharpharm*)

Non-binding if:

- a) If terms are misrepresented, or some other vitiating factor (*Toll*)
 - a. (*Curtis v Chemical Cleaning*.)
- b) Document is not reasonably recognisable as a contractual document
 - a. (*Nalder & Biddle v C & F Fishing*)
- c) Valid claim of *non est factum*

2. Notice

For terms to be incorporated by notice, a party must either:

- a) Know of the terms; or
- b) Be given reasonable notice of the terms (*Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking*)
 - a. Document must be **contractual** in nature
 - i. (*Chapleton v Barry Urban*)
 - b. Notice must be given **prior to contracting**
 - i. (*Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking*)
 - ii. (*Oceanic Shipping v Fay*)
 - iii. (*Baltic Shipping v Dillon*)
 - c. Attention must be brought to **unusual or onerous** terms.
Including: exclusion of liability clauses (*Spurling*), exclusive jurisdiction clauses (*Oceanic*) and holding fees (*Interfoto*)
 - i. (*Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw*)

3. Course of Dealing

If dealing is long, consistent, and frequent, the terms may have been said to have been incorporated by dealing (*Kendall v Lillico*)

It is not an 'essential pre-condition' that terms were validly incorporated into any prior contract (*La Rosa v Hudrill*)

Integration

For a pre-contractual statement to be contractually enforceable, the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The statement must amount to a **warranty**, not a mere representation. A warranty requires that:
 - a. The statement must be **promissory** in nature (*Savage v Blakney*)
 - b. An **objective test** must be applied, i.e. would a reasonable person conclude that an assumption of contractual obligation was intended (*Oscar Chess v Williams*)
 - i. Must not be a statement of belief (*Oscar Chess v Williams*)
 - ii. Must not be one's opinion (*Ross v Allis Charmers*)
 - iii. Must be asked, if so important, why was the alleged warranty not included in the final contract? (*Shepperd v Ryde*)
 - iv. Along with the above, the following considerations are influential in determining whether the statement is a warranty:
 - a. Importance of the statement
 - b. Expertise of the promiser
 - c. Did the statement induce the plaintiff into contract?
 - d. Was there reliance by the plaintiff?
 - e. Can the content of the term be formulated precisely?
2. If a warranty is proven, it must either:
 - a. Form part of the **main contract**
 - i. **Parol Rule:**
 1. If the contract is fully integrated (wholly in writing), no evidence "may be adduced to subtract from, add to, vary, or contradict the language" of the contract
 - a. (*Codelfa v State Rail*)
 - b. (*State Railway v Heath, Couchman v Hill, Evans v Merzario*)
 - ii. **Entire Agreement Clause:**
 1. Shows the intention of the parties that the document contains all terms; however, its effectiveness is not always certain in cases of
 - a. Fraud and / or misrepresentation
 - b. Operation of an implied term;
 - i. (*Hart v MacDonald*)
 - c. Proof of a collateral contract;
 - i. (*McMahon v National Foods*)
 - d. Informal variations on the contract
 - i. (*Commonwealth v Crothall Hospital Services*)
 - e. Promissory estoppel
 - i. (*Franklins v Metcash Trading, Saleh v Romanous*)
 - b. Form part of a **collateral contract**
 - i. Consideration for the collateral contract (which contains the pre-contractual promise made) is the entering into of the main contract
 1. (*Van Den Eschert v Chappell*)
 - ii. Collateral contract may **add** terms to main contract

- iii. However, if in direct conflict with main contract, the parol evidence rule applies and collateral contract cannot impinge or alter main agreement
 1. (*Hoyts v Spencer*)
 2. Criticised, but the HC declined to overrule in *Crown Melbourne v Cosmopolitan Hotel*