

Cartesian Dualism

- **Semantic Q** – what is the mind? What do we mean by the mind?, **methodological Q** – what methods are best suited to investigating the mind, **epistemological Q** – what could count as an explanation of conscious experience?, **metaphysical Q** – what is the relationship between the mind and the body? Are mind and body identical?
- **physicalism** – the one thing or substance that exists in the world is matter and everything else is made out of that and has to be explained in terms of that
- **cartesian dualism** – two fundamental kinds of things or substances in reality, really different, cannot be reduced to the other or explained in terms of the other, they are mind and matter – fundamentally different **kinds of substances** exist, **minds & bodies** are different kinds of substances, human persons are **composite beings**, composed of a mind and a body, minds and bodies **causally influence** each other
- **Cartesian dualist in response to metaphysical Q: what is the relationship between the mind and the body** – they are fundamentally different kinds of things that interact with the mind and the body, **are mind and body identical** – no, **or are they different kinds of entities** – yes, **could the mind, at least in principle, exist without the body** – yes
- Physical states can cause other physical states, mental states can cause other mental states
- **Cogito Ergo Sum** – “I think, therefore I am”, cannot doubt one’s existence – thinking about one’s existence affirms that one is a thinking thing, and thus exists
- **Leibniz’s Law** – if two things are identical, then they have the same properties; if two things have exactly the same properties, then they are identical
- **Mind** – ‘essence’ of the mind is **thinking**, mental processes have **temporal**, but **no spatial location**, have no mass, shape, or size, are **not divisible**
- **Matter** – ‘essence’ of matter is extension; matter is bulky, it has shape and size, matter has **spatial and temporal** location, has no mental properties, is **divisible**
- **Problems for cartesian dualism** – problem of interaction, the “pairing problem”
- **Problem of interaction** – how can the dualist account for the **causal interaction** between **material** and **immaterial** substances, that share no properties and are fundamentally different, Descartes’ response – confers to how “vividly” his “own nature teaches” him that he has a body and that through the “sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, and so on”, that his mind is “not merely present in” his “body as a sailor is present in a ship”, but that his mind is “very closely joined”, sharing a very intimate relationship with his body, describing that it is “**intermingled with it**” making it so that he and his “body form a unit”, unity of the mind and the body occurs in the **pineal gland**, Elizabeth’s response – how can the mind determine bodily motions in order to instigate voluntary actions, given that they are two fundamentally different things, movement seems to occur from an antecedent cause or driver – one physical thing like a tennis racket impacting with another physical thing like a tennis ball and passing on its momentum to bring about movement, nature of such movement happening through impulsion requires physical contact and extension, which are properties of matter, she points out that Descartes excludes extension from the notion he has of the mind, because of the incompatibility of the two, causation is not possible – **causation requires physical contact and extension but the mind has neither**, and so this fails to show how a causal relationship between immaterial minds and mechanical bodies could exist
- **“pairing problem”** – Billy and Suzy throwing rocks at buildings and shattering a glass – principle governing the ‘pairing’ of the right cause with the right effect would be a **causal chain** and **spatiotemporal relations**, in the case of two minds (M1, M2) and two bodies (B1, B2) where both the minds have the desire to kick a soccer ball into a goal, which is followed by the bodies kicking the ball into the goal, the principle governing the ‘pairing’ would not be the same – **spatiotemporal relations cannot be found** since **minds have no spatial location** and so there would be no way of ‘pairing’ the right cause with the right effect, without a solution to the pairing problem, immaterial objects are **causally isolated** and **explanatorily useless**

Behaviourism

- **(ontological/radical) Behaviourism** – mental states are nothing but behaviour (or dispositions to behave), attributions of mental states are always false (mental states don’t exist)
- **(logical/analytical) Behaviourism** – every meaningful psychological expression can be defined solely in terms of behavioural and physical expressions (doesn’t say mental states don’t exist, but statements/claims that mention mental states are meaningless)
- Imagine a friend comes to visit Monash. You show them the Menzies Building, the library, some places to eat. Then they say to you, “This is all great. Now show me the University.” – **Gilbert Ryle** calls this a “**category mistake**”
- 1. I am going to the library, 2. I am going to the university – because ‘library’ and ‘university’ play the same sort of role in each sentence, it’s tempting to conclude that ‘library’ and ‘university’ denote **different things from the same category**
- **Language tricks us into mistaken conclusions**, our talk about our mind is similar – 1. I moved my arm because my muscles contracted, 2. I moved my arm because my mind chose to, this makes it seem like my muscles and my mind are **different members of the same category of things**, muscles (buildings) & mind (university)
- “What sort of thing is a mind? – **Ryle’s suggestion is that even in asking that question you’ve made a mistake because the mind isn’t a thing like other things e.g. bottles, taxis, doorknobs, and so the question “what sort of thing is a mind?” is just a weird feature of how our language works that tricks us.**