




RESEARCHER	AIM / THEORIES	PROCEDURE	FINDINGS
Turiel et al (1987) - The moral/conventional distinction task	Determine what violations and what they contain will elicit a moral response from children.	Presented children with a list of rule violations. All these things violated expectations or a norm including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - One child hits another - One child pushes another off a swing - A boy wears a dress to school - A child talks out of turn in class He then asked a series of questions: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is it wrong? 2. Is it punishable? 3. What if a teacher in a school said X was ok? Would it still be wrong? (authority dependent) 4. Is it wrong because of where and when it occurred? (General in scope) 5. How is the wrongness explained? (rights violation, harm, justice) 	Some of the violations elicited a specific response from the participant: <u>Signature moral response (SMR):</u> occurred when the scenario was: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Serious, wrong, bad - Punishable - Authority independent - General in scope (universally wrong) - Appeals to harm <u>Signature conventional response (SCR):</u> occurred when the scenario was: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Less serious, less wrong, less bad - Less punishable - Authority dependent - Local in scope - No appeals to harm The key to determining the response is to determine whether the stimuli is harmful or endangers welfare.

<p>Haidt, Koller and Dias (1993)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SMR without harm 	<p>To determine if a scenario that does not violate harm is still judged as morally wrong? Can we extend on Turiel's theory?</p>	<p>Asked participant is such scenarios are morally wrong:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cleaning the toilet with the national flag - Eating the family dog after it has been hit by a car - Having sex with a dead chicken bought from the supermarket 	<p>Found that certain non-harm violations evoke the signature moral response. All norm violations involve no harm yet some people judge these transgressions as authority independent and general in scope. Unlike Turiel, showed that you can produce SMR without the presence of clear harm or injustice.</p>
<p>Kelley, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler (2007)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Harm doesn't elicit SMR 	<p>What if a harm occurs but it does not evoke the signature moral response? Showed that when violations are considered to be authority dependent and local in scope, even when the behaviour causes harm can be deemed morally right and not evoke the SMR. In conflict with Turiel proving that it is more than the mere presence of harm and injustice that evoke a judgment of wrongness.</p>	<p>Experiment 1 Scenario 1: the military training of elite American commandoes included a simulated interrogation by enemy forces in which the trainees were threatened and physically abused. The pentagon has recently prohibited the use of physical abuse of trainees, however a Sargent still uses the technique. Scenario 2: imagine that the pentagon never gave such orders prohibiting physical abuse.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If Turiel's theory was true there should be no difference between the two conditions because the presence of harm is 	<p>Experiment 1</p> <p>From the results it can be seen that the act of abusing trainees was considered less morally wrong when the authority did not prohibit the behaviour whereas when the behaviour was prohibited by the authorities then it was judged as being more morally wrong. Therefore, a SMR was not evoked even though harm occurred because it was considered to be authority dependent.</p>

		<p>equally as wrong and independent of authority</p> <p>Experiment 2 Scenario 1: three hundred year ago whipping was a common practice. There was no law against it and everyone thought it was an appropriate punishment, Mr William, a sailor from 300 year ago punished his men with whipping. Scenario 2: Mr Adam is an officer on a large modern American cargo ship in 2014. One night he whips one of his sailors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turiel states that it does not matter when the violation occur, because all forms of harm are universal in scope therefore there will be no difference in perceived wrongness between the two groups 	<p>Experiment 2</p> <p>The results show that when the events occurred 300 years ago the same act of harm is deemed morally right, whereas if it occurred more recently in history then it is morally wrong and evoke the SMR therefore harm can be local in scope.</p>
<p>Wheatley and Haidt (2005)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hypnotic suggestion changes moral 	<p>A way of testing if <u>both</u> intuitions and emotions influence moral judgment is to manipulate emotions and see how this effects moral judgment.</p>	<p>Highly hypnotizable individuals were given the suggestion, under hypnosis, that they would feel a pang of disgust when they saw</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Participants made higher rating of both disgust and moral condemnation for stories containing their hypnotic word - Designed to directly manipulate the intuitive judgment link (link 1) and it demonstrates that artificially increasing the strength of a gut feeling increases the strength of the resulting moral judgment

<p>judgment formation</p>		<p>either the word <i>take</i> or the word <i>often</i> They then read and made moral judgments on six stories that were designed to elicit mild disgust, each would contain either the word <i>take</i> or <i>often</i> e.g. Congressman Arnold Paxton frequently gives speeches condemning corruption and arguing for campaign finance reform,. But her is just trying to cover up the fact that he himself [will <i>take</i> bribes from/is <i>often</i> bribed by] the tobacco lobby, and other special interests, to promote their legislation.</p>	
<p>Schnall et al (2008) - Situational disgust elicits stronger moral condemnation</p>	<p>To determine if environmentally elicited disgust increased moral condemnation in the purity domains.</p>	<p>Split design where half the participants were placed near a bin that was sprayed with ammonium sulphide solution (fart gas) and asked to judge the morality of cousin marriage, sex etc.</p>	<p>Found that those who read the stories standing near the bin with the gas amplified their condemnation compared to those who stood near the bin without the gas.</p>
<p>Rozin et all (1999) - CAD Triad Hypothesis</p>	<p>Is there any specificity in the evoked emotional reactions?</p>	<p>Found that when anger was evoked higher condemnation of moral violations of the autonomy ethics occurred. When contempt was evoked higher condemnation of moral violations of the community ethic occurred. When disgust was evoked higher condemnation of moral violations of the divinity ethic occurred.</p>	

<p>Greene et al (2001, 2004)</p> <p>- Trolley Dilemma</p>	<p>Each problem pits a deontological option (based on the rule: do not kill innocents) against a utilitarian option (greatest good for greatest number)</p> 	<p>But most say <i>yes</i> (util.) to switch but <i>no</i> (i.e., deon) to footbridge</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Deontological response driven by gut-reactions, emotion, intuition ○ Utilitarian response driven by controlled, effortful reasoning processes ○ Now, because the <i>footbridge</i> involves direct contact with another in order to kill (personal), sacrificing this one person is more emotionally aversive, and thus the deontological response is more potent. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✦ Switch: impersonal (no direct contact)– less emotion – util. ✦ Footbridge: personal (direct contact) – more emotion – deon. 												
<p>Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006)</p> <p>- Increased negative emotions creates tendency for deontological and less utilitarian responses</p>	<p>Manipulating emotions before performing the Trolley Dilemma</p> <p>If one reduces negative affect during dilemma processing, one should see more utilitarian responding</p>	<p>Showed half their participants a documentary and the other half a stand-up comedy before giving them the Trolley Dilemma</p>	<p>They found that less people found it inappropriate to push the man off the footbridge after watching the stand-up comedy compared to controls (documentary)</p> <p>TABLE 1 <i>Frequencies of Appropriate and Inappropriate Responses to the Footbridge Dilemma as a Function of Affective State</i></p> <table border="1" data-bbox="1265 1037 1780 1173"> <thead> <tr> <th rowspan="2">Affective state</th> <th colspan="2">Response</th> </tr> <tr> <th>Appropriate</th> <th>Inappropriate</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Control</td> <td>3</td> <td>35</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Positive</td> <td>10</td> <td>31</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Affective state	Response		Appropriate	Inappropriate	Control	3	35	Positive	10	31
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<p>Greene et al (2008)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interfering with the reasoning process 	<p>If utilitarian = controlled, resource-dependent, such responses should be interfered with by cognitive load If deontological = intuitive/emotional, such responses should be immune to cognitive load.</p>	<p>Tested this by providing participants with personal dilemmas while under high cognitive load versus no cognitive load.</p>	<p>Cognitive load selectively disrupts resources dependent, controlled cognitive processes (ie. Reasoning processes), not intuition Therefore, when cognitive load was high utilitarian responses were disrupted.</p>	 <table border="1"> <caption>LS Mean RT (ms) Data</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Condition</th> <th>Utilitarian Judgment (ms)</th> <th>Non-utilitarian Judgment (ms)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>no load</td> <td>~5800</td> <td>~5800</td> </tr> <tr> <td>load</td> <td>~6500</td> <td>~5700</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Condition	Utilitarian Judgment (ms)	Non-utilitarian Judgment (ms)	no load	~5800	~5800	load	~6500	~5700
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<p>Laham, Alter and Goodwin (2009) FROM READINGS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discrepant fluent violations are deemed less morally wrong 	<p>Predicted that moral violations that are processed with discrepant fluency (when the text-ground contrast makes them easy to read) will be judged as less morally wrong than those processed with discrepant disfluency. <u>Hedonic marking hypothesis</u>: that fluently processed moral transgressions will be judged as less wrong than disfluent processed transgressions. <u>Naïve theory</u> = predicts that fluently processed transgressions will be judged as more true or probable, which may in turn lead to judgments of increased wrongfulness.</p>	<p>Participants were read 6 vignettes describing various moral transgressions. Half the vignettes were presented in a way which made them difficult to read (disfluent)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Discrepant perceptual fluency decreased perceptions of wrongness to discrepant disfluency - Discrepant fluency influences judgment, rather than discrepant disfluency - Demonstrates that disfluency triggers systematic reasoning rather than fluency diminishing reliance on such reasoning 										

