Issues in Project Valuation: - problems with earnings accretive vs C/F models

**Earnings focus** – C/F is main focus & determinant of firm value, but reported earnings has significant impact on mgmt. decision making (due to negative market signals)

Projects can be: dilutive (↓EPS in ST) or accretive (↑EPS in ST) – can be time sensitive

- Managers: ST compensation can be linked to operating performance, stock option plans, job security
- **S/H**: operating viability dictates ability to raise financing and grow operations, (+) profitability can improve SP → ↑S/H value, credit rating

**Equity Cost Problem:** (wrong opportunity cost for investment decisions – meaning accounting earnings will overstate economic earnings)

- ↑ earnings from projects can be at odds with the objective of ↑S/H value
- Debt → larger ↑ in EPS b/c adding to EV
- Cost of new acquisitions need to be taken to account (i.e. pay too much) in order to generate accelerating growth
- P/L statement unable to account for true cost of capital, but based on interest income i.e. incorrect equity charge applied → shows earnings accretion when it did not take place

$$\frac{\text{Change in }}{\text{Net Income}} = \underbrace{\left[ \left( \frac{\text{Project}}{\text{Operating Income}} \right) (1 - \text{Tax Rate}) \right]}_{\textbf{NOPAT}}$$

$$\frac{\text{NOPAT}}{\left[ \left( \frac{\text{Interest}}{\text{Expense on }} \right) (1 - \text{Tax Rate}) + \left( \frac{\text{Lost Interest Income}}{\text{- on Cash Used to Fund}} \right) (1 - \text{Tax Rate}) \right]}_{\textbf{Capital Cost}}$$

$$= \text{NOPAT} - \text{Capital Cost} \tag{9.1b}$$

## **Back to Value Enhancement:**

Economic Value Added (EVA)

**Invested Capital:** - derive from balance sheet and make adjustments e.g. not all items represent funding sources – whilst ST debt represents borrowing (part of WC), if focus on acc. payable, these are not funds borrowed by the firm

where 
$$NOPAT_t = EBIT_t * (1-t)$$
  
and  $Capital\ Charge = Invested\ Capital_{t-1} * WACC$ 

 $EVA_t = NOPAT_t - Capital Charge_t$ 

- Need to subtract any NIBL from total assets
- Other adjustments: capitalising operating expenses, leases, eliminating items that cause BV of capital to fall without impacting capital invested.

## **ROC i.e. NOPAT**

- Need to reverse previous adjustments i.e. if capitalising operating leases (↑IC), need to add back to EBIT – cannot both capitalise and expense e.g. R&D

**WACC:** - consistency with BV weights for D/E since IC, ROIC are BV – but market weights may still be more appropriate.

PV of all future economic profits = project NPV – h/e, when project earnings are not evenly distributed over the project life - +/- impact on profits doesn't necessarily correspond to +/- NPV

EVA corrects selection bias when EPS accretion/dilution is a critical decision variable but
does not directly address back-loaded earnings problem (disproportionate amount of their
earnings in the latter half of project life) – capital intensive vs. tech. projects

**Horizon Problem**: managers pick projects b/c of contribution to earnings/growth over value creation – occurs b/c managerial compensation often based on accounting performance valued by stakeholders.

Solutions: 1) Adjust EVA Calc. using 'economic depreciation' – difficult to correlate economic profit decision with NPV decision, 2) Adjusting managerial compensation – lengthen investment horizon

- Bonus bank large fraction of bonuses accumulated for future payment in event of success
- Stock option program

Strengths – Economic Profit	Weaknesses – Economic Profit
Value driven by what income firm makes in	Presents NPV differently
excess of financing costs	
Capital charge accounts for key deficiency in	Account distortions – can be manipulated due
EPS	to ↓ capital invested
Straightforward approach to value than	Single period metric – limited future
NPV/DCF	performance information

## **EVA Alternatives:**

- C/F ROI: measure E(R) using C/F and considering TVM same decision rule as IRR
- Cash Return on Capital Invested (CROCI) = EBITDA / Total Value of equity measures cash profits of a company as a proportion of the funding req. to generate them.

## **Future of Equities Research:**

- Valuation issues if firms exploit info adv, firms w/o leave market → eqm
- HFT typically liquidity providers
- Value priced more accurately than growth

Equities research typically been subsidised by IB fees – but sig. drop in no. of analysts due to:

- Tighter regulations, declining margins, \(\phi\) passive investing, analyst records
- Will soon be illegal to pay for research via trading commissions → shrinks market
- Buy side will need to figure out how to pay cost w/o offering execution services
- Research houses will need to reinvent product.

Traders profit from being  $1^{st}$ , having better info, rational, or cheating – changes in market structure  $(\uparrow tech) \rightarrow \uparrow speed \rightarrow changes valuation through price-discovery and liquidity$ 

**Next decade:** changing data sources and incentives around info development.