

## TOPIC 1: FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS

### What is Constitutional Law?

- Main body of law that regulates the three arms of government; and the relationship between these arms of government
- The **Constitution**: **Three** arms of government:
  - i. Executive Administers and enforces the law. This consists of the Government – includes public service, police and army. Crown is the head of the Executive branch. Crown representative at Cth level is GG, and at State level is Governor
  - ii. Legislative Drafts the law. Consists of the Parliament.
    - <u>Cth Level</u>: House of Representatives, Senate and the Crown.
    - State Level: Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council and Crown; and Bicameral (except for Qld)
    - <u>Legislature</u> = Parliament body that exists to enact laws
  - iii. Judiciary Interprets the law = Courts

### **Fundamental Concepts and Institutions**

- i. Parliamentary Sovereignty
  - No Australian Parl. (Federal/State) → absolutely sovereign
     → powers of <u>all</u> Australian legislature is constrained by the Constitution (sovereign)
    - Considerable constraints on Cth; cf. *flexible* State
       Constitutions (mostly stemming from *Cth Constitution*)
  - Criticisms of Parliamentary Supremacy: no check and balance; tyranny of the majority; breaches of HR
- ii. Rule of Law
  - Ruled by law and not by men or people
    - Preventing arbitrary exercise of power
    - Equality before the law
    - Individual rights: rights of citizens (bottom-up)
  - Inconsistent with Parl. Sovereignty: Parliament can do what it likes cf. ROL setting boundaries
- iii. Rule of Law: Australia's interpretation
  - '[T]he Australian Constitution is framed upon the assumption of the rule of law.'

### iv. Bicameralism

- Australia's Federal Parliament is <u>bicameral</u>: two houses, Lower House (House of Reps); Upper House (Senate – democratically elected)
- VIC: Legislative Council (Upper House); Legislative Assembly (Lower House)
  - Lower House: represents interests of individual voters; popularly elected
  - Upper house: represents the interests of the States. States are equally represented, regardless of population
- o Bill must pass through **both** houses to be considered a law
- v. Representative Government: Composition of lower house of government (HoR)
  - Democratically elected: Parliament's source of authority is in the population

### vi. Responsible Government

- I. Executive (Government) is responsible to the Legislature (Parliament)
  - Crown (G-G) acts on the advise of its Ministers
  - Ministers (including PM) may only remain in government while having the confidence of the Lower House (i.e. majority in HoR)
  - Once Government loses majority → Constitutional convention that Government will <u>resign</u> and call an election
  - No clean separation between Legislative and Executive branches: because Executive run by Cabinet (PM and several Ministers); but members of Cabinet also part of Parliament (Legislative); PM head of both Executive and Legislature
- II. Ministerial Responsibility: Ministers *individually* responsible to Parliament
  - Responsible for the activities of the administrative departments they head
  - Accountability in public service: can be made to resign for failure of proper oversight

### vii. Parliamentary Control of Supply

Supply (ordinary annual budget for government services)
 must be authorised by Parliament: \$81, 83; with supply

**TOPIC 5: CTH LEGISLATIVE POWERS - GENERAL PRINCIPLES** 

### **CHARACTERISATION OF CTH LAWS**

### **Characterisation: Definition**

Process of determining whether a Cth law falls within a HoP

### General

- Essential question: Does this law fall within one of the Cth's heads of Power (HoP)? Is it a law 'with respect to' the subject matter?
- Nature: Cth legislative power is <u>limited</u> ('enumerated' powers express topics)
  - Cf. State's HoP: States have **plenary** legislative power
  - Cf. other legislative powers: <u>concurrent</u> powers (both Cth and State can legislate)

### I. TRADITIONAL APPROACH: Doctrine of RESERVED STATE POWERS

#### General

- Historically, HC adopted a <u>very narrow approach</u> to the characterization of Cth laws
  - Certain legislative areas → <u>reserved</u> for the **State**, and cannot impinge on them, otherwise Cth law will be invalid
- Negative characterization (looking at what laws could <u>not</u> do, rather than what they could do) and <u>interpreted narrowly</u> to ensure preservation of *maximum area of unimpeded State regulation*
- Rationale: States form the Constitution did not want to forfeit all their power

### See *R v Barger* (1908)

### **FACTS:**

- Soon after Federation, Cth passed the Excise Tariff Act 1906 (Cth)
   which imposed a tax on manufacturers of agricultural implements
  - Concerned with the <u>validity</u> of certain provisions
- S 2 concerned the exemption of tax: Cth argued validity under S 51(ii) re taxation
  - Exempted manufacturers from tax if complied with working conditions deemed by Cth government to be *fair* and *reasonable* (working conditions of farm workers)

■ Cth argued <u>valid law</u> pursuant to S 51(ii) Cth Constitution → gives Cth power to legislate re taxation

ISSUE: Whether Excise Tariff Act fell within taxation HoP

- Mr Barger (B) argued <u>not</u> a law regarding <u>taxation</u>: had <u>ulterior</u>
   *purpose* (beyond raising tax/revenue) → to <u>encourage the adoption</u>
   of certain labour practices within the agricultural sector
  - Evident from how manufacturers that complied with certain labour conditions → exempt from paying tax

### **HELD: Majority** agreed with **B**

- Found that the law could <u>not</u> be characterized under S 51(ii) Cth
   Constitution ('tax power') because not a law re taxation
  - Regulations of the conditions of labour not part of HoP
  - Disguising by title of legislation is not valid: <u>substance</u> of the act trumps form
- o Cth laws *incapable* of <u>dual characterization</u>
  - Although ETA <u>objectively</u> about <u>taxation</u> and <u>labour</u> <u>conditions</u> → Court held it to be regarding 'conditions of manufacture of agricultural implements'
  - Could not be about both → hence constitutionally invalid
- o Substance of the SM of law trumps form
  - Disguising <u>substance</u> of subject matter by title of legislation → invalid excuse
  - HC drew from Communist case as per Fullagar J: validity of a law/ administrative act under the law cannot be made to depend on the opinion of the lawmaker...
  - Inquiry is concerned about the substance of the legislation, not the motives
  - Cf. <u>Isaacs J (Higgins J agreed)</u> in <u>dissent</u>: Doctrine of <u>equivalence</u> regarding <u>differentiation</u> between <u>tax</u> and <u>penalties</u> i.e. in various scenarios of taxation – tax is on the <u>goods</u>, but for various purposes and intentions
- Assumption: Certain SM of legislation <u>reserved</u> for State Parliament's sole legislative power
  - Court decided here that it was a law about <u>working conditions</u>, not <u>taxation</u>, and hence <u>constitutionally invalid</u>

Judicial Review by HC: see *Australian Communist Party case* (1951) as per Fullagar J re substance > form

- A power to make laws with respect to lighthouses does not authorize the making of a law with respect to anything which is, in the opinion of the law-maker, a lighthouse."
  - Directly translated: A power to make laws re taxation does not authorize the making of a law with respect to anything which is, in the opinion of the Parl, taxation
- II. Explosion of RESERVED STATE POWERS i.e. rejection of reserved power doctrine: *Engineers*

## See **Engineers**

### **FACTS:**

- The <u>Engineers Trade Union</u> lodged an industrial claim in the *Cth* Arbitration Ct against 843 employers would not be controversial,
   <u>WA govt</u> was one of the <u>employers</u> involved
- S 51(xxxv) of the Cth Constn gives the Cth power to make laws wrt the conciliation and arbitration of inter-state industrial disputes

**ISSUES:** Whether the **Cth** could make laws binding the **WA govt** under this **HoP** 

- According to RSP doctrine → law <u>invalid</u> because *labour relations* involving a state government – area of state reserved power
- However, the Court did not apply the RSP doctrine in this case

### **HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION**

- Majority championed a *legalistic, literal approach* to constitutional interpretation
  - Cth HoP to be interpreted in accordance with natural meaning of the word therein
  - S 51(xxxv) should <u>not</u> be read to exclude States from its jurisdiction, because it does <u>not</u> explicitly state that States are excluded
- <u>No</u> implied limitations should be read into HoP unless such implication *necessarily* or *logically* flows from the text
- HC held that RSP doctrine <u>not</u> a valid doctrine: reasoning premised on the idea that those <u>powers not explicitly given to the Cth</u>
  - Assumed that Cth has power if it falls under one of the Cth HoP
  - However, no automatic presumption that implicitly solely belongs to the State

### O DIRECT CHARECTERISATION:

- Fairfax & Murphyores tell us that we look at the <u>subject</u>
   matter of the law and determine whether it goes to the subject
   matter of a head of power (substance > form, intention,
   incidental policies, purposes etc.)
- Dual characterisation is possible

### **O INCIDENTAL CHARACTERISATION:**

- Definition: Even if SM of the law does <u>not</u> go to the *heart* of the SM of the HOP → look at whether it is *related* (*O'Sullivan v Noarlunga Meat*)
  - HC held that a law that required the registration of slaughterhouses fell within the <u>international trade and</u> <u>commerce</u> HoP because it fell w/in the *process chain* of <u>exporting</u> meat from those slaughterhouses

### O PROPORTIONALITY:

- Relevant in determining whether a law falls within a purposive HoP <u>and</u> whether a law falls within the incidental scope of a non-purposive HoP (Nationwide News)
- Will <u>not</u> be relevant in determining whether a law falls within the direct scope of a non-purposive HoP(Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration)
- VI. <u>CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES</u> (where HC rules that Cth law <u>cannot</u> be categorised under any of the HoP)
  - <u>i.</u> Law will be <u>STRUCK DOWN</u>, and declared *ab initio*
  - <u>ii.</u> Law will be <u>SEVERED</u> i.e. to give effect to the will of Parliament, sever section from rest of the law (which remains valid)
    - Possibly <u>problematic</u>: easy to severe if it does <u>not</u> inherently affect other sections of the act
    - However, if section is *integral* to other sections of the act: cutting it out would defeat the act → severance not possible
  - <u>iii.</u> Law will be <u>READ DOWN</u>: construe more narrowly than why it currently is written as, so that it can be regarded as *constitutionally valid*

- o Two considerations:
  - i. Corporations act through **natural persons**
  - ii. In order to be effective, a regulation of the activities of corporations calls for the <u>imposition of duties upon those</u> natural persons
    - Corporations oft artificial entities → does not make sense to prohibit an abstract entity if people are not also prohibited from engaging in that behaviour
- Valid under the incidental scope of corporations power

# See *Re Dingjan; Ex Parte Wagner* (1995) 183 CLR 323 Facts:

- Involved a challenge to certain sections of the *Industrial Relations* Act 1988 (Cth)
  - ss 127A & 127B: Industrial Relations Commission had power to review and vary contracts to which independent contractors were a party, if those contracts were unfair, harsh or contrary to public interest
  - S127C(1) defined the contracts as:
    - a) Those contracts to which a const corp is a party; (would be valid if <u>broad</u> view from *Tassie Dams* adopted)
    - b) \*\*A contract relating to the <u>business of a const corp</u>; (would be valid if an even **broader view** than the <u>broad</u> view from <u>Tassie Dams</u> adopted)
      - ▶ Provides the link to constitutional corporations
    - c) A contract entered into by a <u>const corp</u> for the <u>purposes</u> of the <u>business of the corp</u> (would be valid if <u>narrow</u> view from <u>Tassie Dams</u> adopted >> fall-back)
- Concerned a <u>trading</u> corporation → <u>Tasmanian Pulp and Forest</u>
   Holdings engaged in woodchip business → first limb fulfilled
  - TPFH contracted with Mr and Mrs Wagner to harvest and transport timber
  - Mr and Mrs W then subcontracted task to Mr and Mrs Dingjan
- Contract falls either under SS 127C(1)(a) which allows industrial commission to review contracts to which a constitutional corporation is a party;
- and 127C(1)(c) which allows industrial commission to review contracts entered into by the constitutional corporation for the purpose of the business of the corporation (Ws were harvesting and transporting the timber)

- However, the Ws then subcontracted their work to Mr and Mrs D →
  this K became the subject of the case
- 1992: W sought to vary certain K provisions with the Ds
  - Ds were <u>not</u> in agreement asked the Industrial Relations Commission to review the K, claiming that it fell within the purview of this law because related to the *business of a* constitutional corporation
  - Even though TPFH not privy to K because it was a K re business of a constitutional corporation, the Commission had power to review
  - Ws then sought to terminate the K
  - Commission reviewed and reinstated the K

### **ISSUES:**

- Whether the provision of the IRA which gave the Commission the power over this K was valid
- o Was S 127C(1)(b) a valid section of the K?
  - The only section giving Commission power over the K
  - Test for whether a law can be characterised under the incidental scope of the corporations power

**HELD: Majority** found that **S 127C(1)(b)** was <u>invalid</u> on the basis that it fell outside the scope of the **corporations** power

- Clearly did not fall within the *direct scope* of the power: was <u>not</u> directed at any constitutional corporation, or rights and duties of a constitutional corporation (first limb)
- Further, to be characterised under the *incidental scope* → needs to have *some beneficial or detrimental effect* on the constitutional corporation (McHugh J)
  - K relating to the business of a constitutional corporation → would not necessarily have such an effect e.g. K between W and D was varied so as to change the route by which timber was transported → probably would not have any actual effect on the constitutional corporation

**MINORITY: Deane & Gaudron JJ** seemed to agree in principle with the majority

- To fall within the *incidental scope* of the <u>corporations power</u>: law must have some kind of *beneficial* or *detrimental effect* on the constitutional corporation
- o Disagreed on the facts of the case:

### **TOPIC 9: IMPLIED INTERGOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITIES**

### **General: Limits to legislative power**

- Once an act can be validly characterized under a relavant HoP: is there any other basis on which the act is *invalid*?
- o IGI: Specific issue of
  - Whether the Cth can pass legislation which is binding on the States as an entity; and conversely,
  - ii. Whether the States can pass their own legislation which binds the Cth

### **Contextual Background**

- RECIPROCAL (IMPLIED) IMMUNITIES: Pre-Engineers States immune from Cth laws, and Cth immune from State laws
  - Rationale: HC will draw on the fundamental constitutional principle of FEDERALISM
    - Cth and States act as <u>independent</u> and <u>autonomous</u> entitles → cannot pass legislation that affect each other
  - Cth immune from State laws (D'emden v Pedder)
    - Tasmanian statute could <u>not</u> impose a Cth law on an officer (rep. of Cth)
  - States immune from Cth laws (Railway Servant's case)
    - Cth Industrial Award and whether it could bind the way the NSW government treated its own employees – no

### See Engineers (1920)

### **FACTS:**

- Industrial Trade Union launched an *industrial claim* in the Cth Arbitration Court, lodged against 843 employers – not controversial
- However, controversy arises because <u>Western Australian</u> government part of employers

#### ISSUES:

Whether <u>Cth</u> Arbitration Court has jurisdiction over the <u>WA govt</u> (<u>state</u>)

#### HELD:

- Pursuant to the doctrine of IGI (established in Railway Servants): WA
  govt would have been immune to the jurisdiction of the Cth Court
- However, Court held that Cth Arbitration Court <u>did</u> have jurisdiction over the WA govt

- Majority upheld a <u>textual/ literal</u> approach to constitutional interpretation
  - Cth HoP to be interpreted in accordance with the *natural meaning* of the words therein i.e. *no implied limitations* to be
     read into Cth HoP, unless flowing naturally or logically from the
     text itself
- Cth Arbitration Court established pursuant to the conciliation and arbitration power (\$ 51(xxxv) Constitution)
  - Court held <u>not</u> necessary or logical to *imply* that state instrumentalities were *immune* from laws enacted under the Cth's conciliation and arbitration power
- Ratio: Clearly authorises Cth to pass legislation which binds state government instrumentalities → States no longer immune from Cth laws
- Obiter: Courts authorised reciprocal power by the States → Cth no longer immune from State laws
- HC rejected the doctrine of <u>implied intergovernmental immunities</u>: implications to be avoided in constitutional interpretation
  - However, <u>certain exceptions</u> have developed to maintain the Federal balance of powers
  - Developed differently re State immunity for Cth laws; and Cth immunity for State laws (not completely reciprocal)
- I. State Immunity from Cth law

### **General**

- Engineers: Court established that the Cth <u>can</u> bind the States, but not the extent to which Cth can do so
  - There are <u>limits</u> to the Cth's power to pass legislation which is binding on states
    - a. Express: There has to be a HoP; and further limitations regarding SOP and Freedom of Religion (S 116)
    - b. Implied: Arise from Australia's federal nature and the detrimental impact that some laws might have on the r/s with Cth and the State → need to safeguard the continued existence of both Cth and State governments

### TOPIC 10: SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (CTH)

#### General

- Cth does <u>not</u> have *plenary* law-making power: has <u>enumerated</u> law-making power i.e. only legislate over subjects that the Constitution specifically gives it power to legislate over
- Limits on the Parl's law-making power: <u>separation of powers</u>

## Separation of Powers: The 'pure' doctrine

- Functions of the <u>three</u> arms of government should be *clearly* and institutionally separated: Executive, Legislature, Judiciary
- o Rationale: Each branch have its own role
  - i. **Legislature**: *creates* the law
  - ii. Executive: executes/ administers the law
  - iii. Judiciary: adjudicates the law
- Check-and-balance: Ensures power is <u>not</u> concentrated less likely to be abused

### SOP doctrine in Australia:

- However, Australia's context: Strict <u>judicial</u> separation; Incomplete Separation b/w Legislative and Exectutive
  - Government (Executive) forms part of the Legislature i.e.
     Executive sits w/in the Parliament → impossible in the Australian Constitution to have a complete separation of Legislature from Executive
  - Nonetheless, there is a <u>clear separation</u> of JUDICIAL power from <u>Legislature</u> and <u>Executive</u>
- Notion of an <u>independent</u> judiciary: <u>ruled by law</u>, not <u>arbitrary</u> exercises of power/ politicized decisions
  - HC insists that Chap III Const requires the separation of federal judicial power, from the exercise of federal legislative or executive power
- Parliament (Legislative) may delegate some of its legislative authority to the Executive e.g. <u>subordinate legislation</u> (Victorian Stevedoring v Dignan)

 Separation between Executive and Legislature (Victorian Stevedoring v Dignan (1931))

### **FACTS:**

- S 3 Transport Workers Act authorised the GG (member of the Executive) to make regulations regarding the employment of transport workers → broad legislative authority conferred on the GG
- Alleged that it was *unconstitutional*: no guidelines regarding what GG should take into account re *employment* → GG had <u>unfettered</u> discretion regarding employment of transport workers
- Act also specifically stipulated that regulations made under this act by the GG (Executive) would override prior acts of the Parl (Legislature)
  - Traditional rule of statutory interpretation: *later* act overrides an *earlier* act and this applied to <u>regulations</u>
  - Regulations that GG was given <u>unfettered discretion</u> to *unilaterally* enact would override any *prior*, *inconsistent legislation* → reasonably controversial
- Broad authority conferred onto GG challenged as <u>unconstitutional</u> because it *violated* the SoP doctrine
  - Separation of the Legislature from the Executive

### **HELD: HC** found that **S** 3 → **valid** delegation of **legislative** power

- GG allowed to continue making rules re *employment* of transport workers:
- Such rules did not have to pass through Parliament
- Extension of Parliament's <u>legislative</u> power necessary for effective government (Evatt J)
  - Pragmatic approach: Government would <u>not</u> be able to function property w/o the ability of Legislature to *delegate* some of its law-making powers to the Executive or other authorities
  - Parliament could <u>not</u> possibly be tasked with enacting everything

# VALIDITY OF A DELEGATION OF <u>LEGISLATIVE</u> POWER: <u>TWO</u> factors of consideration

- Responsible Government: Executive is responsible to the Legislature (Parliament) (Evatt J)
  - Executive as the <u>best body</u> to deal with the *delegation* of legislation
  - Necessary for legislation & delegated legislation to fall within the HoP