

AIR244 Weekly Reading Schedule

Week 1: Introduction

Snyder, Craig A. 'Contemporary Security and Strategy', in Contemporary Security and Strategy, 3rd edition, Craig A. Snyder (ed.) Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012, pp. 1-16.

Chapter 1

- Key concepts in security studies: security, power, conflict, nation state
- Strategy: use or threat of the use of force in IR
- **Strategic studies**: how the instrument of force influence the relations btw states, focus on military strategy, realist interpretation of IR
- **Security studies**: broadened definition of threat, including non-military threats to states+ non-state actors+ sub-state groups, critical-theory approach (human interaction has *created* structures of international system -> not natural+ no absolute nature), closer to IR (deals w causes, consequences+ **conduct** of war)
- Strategic+ Security studies difference: what is considered *security threats*,
- **Cold War**: *new* focus in strategic studies -> concept of deterrence, overemphasis on military aspects of national security over other elements, regional conflicts (eg. Vietnam) explained 'as proxy wars'
- **Post-Cold War**: security studies -> role of military power scrutinized, revival of (liberal) multilateral cooperation -> de-legitimization of force as tool of statecraft, need to redefine+ expand security, questioning of marginal costs of security (military budgets, civil liberties), shift away from state to the individual or sub-state groups
- **9/11**: focus on military dimension, rather than political, social or economic dimensions of antipathy of al Qaeda towards the West

Study Notes AIR244 - Topics

Q3: The Proliferation of WMDs – Kenneth Boutin

- How **effective** are the contemporary **arms control and disarmament regimes** in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction?
- Identify and assess the **mechanisms that seek to control the spread** of weapons of mass destruction?
- Is the **non-proliferation regime** viable today? Discuss in regards to the **threats** from within and without the regime as well as the **causes of nuclear proliferation**.
- Discuss the effectiveness of the **contemporary efforts the West** has put in place to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
 - **Effectiveness arms control and disarmament regimes:**
 - Con:
 - Based on crucial norms of *engagement, voluntarism, equality* as political underpinnings
 - NPT: accepts US, Russia, China, UK, France as signatories without requiring them to abandon nuclear weapons
 - NPT: despite near-universal membership uneven coverage due to weaknesses of some states' national non-proliferation mechanisms
 - Remains state-centric and hierarchical proliferation environment (largely unaltered from Cold War)
 - Changing patterns of R&D: high-technology industries (nuclear related) -> provides basis for innovative proliferation strategies and emergence of secondary nuclear suppliers
 - Uneven developmental level/pace of emerging nuclear states/programmes contributes to reluctance of non-p regime
 - Pro:
 - Useful in terms of providing longstanding common framework to pursue general non-proliferation objectives
 - Introduction of Additional Protocols and country-specific sanctions targeted at industries/suppliers (eg. US '2000 Iran Non-proliferation Act', '2005 Iran and Syria Non-proliferation Act')
 - **Mechanisms to control the spread of WMDs**
 - **How do all the mechanisms work and how effective are they?**
 - Non-proliferation regimes

- Encompasses an extensive array of national and international instruments designed to limit or prevent the proliferation of WMDs, *two arms* of the regime:
- Vertical non-proliferation: limiting/ultimately eliminating arsenals of those states that are formally accorded nuclear weapons status (NPT)/ possess chemical weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC 1997, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW)/ biological weapons (the Geneva Protocol, 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention, 1975)
 - o Instruments: SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talk), INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces), START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) -> generally involve only US+ Russia, also limited: NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1970), (FMCT, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty), (CTBT, Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty: as of 2013 eight "Annex 2 states" (states that participated in the CTBT's negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time) have not ratified the treaty: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the US have signed but not ratified the Treaty; India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed it)
- Horizontal non-proliferation: deterrence of nuclear aspirants and prevention of acquisition of nuclear/ chemical/ biological weapons
 - o Instruments: NPT+ 'safeguard system': IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1957), MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime, 1987), NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee, 1971), NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group, 1975), (FMCT, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty), (CTBT, Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty)
 - o PSI (2003): policy shift -> more confrontational approach, *not* based on traditional norms of engagement, voluntarism, and equality but following counter-proliferation approach (Clinton, 1993)

- **Viability of non-proliferation regime today**

- ***Threats from within and without the nuclear proliferation regime***

- Threats from within the regime:
- unbalanced/unequal application of nuclear non-proliferation measures (NPT's exceptionalism towards the P5)
- Ongoing efforts by these states to maintain viability of nuclear arsenals through fielding of enhanced delivery systems (-> failure to address vertical proliferation)
- Growing tension btw vertical and horizontal non-p: policies incompatible w established norms (eg. 2008 US- India unprecedented agreement)
- Threats from without:
- Failure to address politico-military factors (non-state actors) acquiring/supplying nuclear materials, rogue-states (eg. North Korea, Iran, Syria) as 'emerging nuclear states'
- Current state of affairs: most states agree on the importance of pursuing non-p on the basis of engagement, voluntarism and equality, but *no* consensus on what needs to be done/ how to proceed

- **Effectiveness of contemporary Western efforts to prevent WMD**

- Weaknesses: advancing nuclear weapons programmes of particular states, changing proliferation patterns, changing (nuclear) supply environment, non-state actors' interest in 'mass-casualty event' capabilities (eg. nuclear weapons or radiological dispersal devices, RDDs), proliferation of nuclear-capable delivery systems (eg. strategic and tactical ballistic and cruise missiles)
- Reinforcement: Obama (2008) re-engaged multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms, commitment to further nuclear arsenal reductions, Russian commitment to nuclear arsenal reductions, China's greater support to multilaterally deal w suspected/confirmed
- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): global effort aiming to stop trafficking of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern
- Obama: changed agenda compared to Bush, supports NPT, aims to ratify CTBT and to negotiate FMCT, supports 'zero-option' (envision of 'world free from nuclear weapons')
- New START: ratified by Russia+ US -> significant advance on both START and SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 2002)

→ more than only nuclear, also chemical and biological side

Types of Proliferation

- Standard distinction given in the literature on proliferation:
- **Horizontal proliferation:** is the spread of nuclear weapons/WMDs to states or actors not previously possessing them -> has been considered the more dangerous of the two (“the greatest security challenge to be faced in the post-Cold War era”)
- **Vertical proliferation:** is the accumulation of stockpiles of nuclear weapons by those states already in possession of them
- Recent developments reduce the tension btw horizontal and vertical non-proliferation -> contributing to legitimacy of the horizontal non-proliferation regime

Types of actors involved

- Demand side:
- Nuclear-weapon states: as recognized as per NPT five states: the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council)
- Emerging (or threshold) nuclear-weapon states: states that are suspected as approaching/already passed nuclear threshold: North Korea, Iran, possibly Syria
- Non-state actors: such as terrorist groups
- Supply side:
- Traditional suppliers of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment: bound to the provisions of the NPT, eg. NSG
- Emerging secondary supplier: non-traditional suppliers, not bound to NPT and in position to assist in circumventing supply-side control mechanism (backbone of horizontal non-p regime)

Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation (Lavoy)

- "Proliferation pessimists" vs. "Proliferation optimists" -> overly simplified notions of what drives and inhibits national nuclear weapons activities
- Regime: detecting, deterring, and punishing proliferation
- Sources of nuclear proliferation: diverse
 - o 'traditional': character of international politics, availability of military **technology**, effectiveness of non-proliferation measures, for **security** purposes, **prestige** of nuclear arms acquisition
 - o Lavoy: importance of nuclear myths and myth makers (rests on three simple assumptions: (1) the beliefs of individuals matter for foreign policy making; (2) policymakers' beliefs about nuclear weapons are particularly important; and (3) talented and well-placed experts can help create, diffuse, and perpetuate nuclear myths)
- 'Nuclear strategy is the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence.'

PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative)

- initiative's core members are careful to emphasize that PSI is “an activity, not an organization” -> no established organization w headquarter, no binding legal mandates or charter (better understood as a framework than a formal structure)
- “broken tail light” approach to stop crime
- Criticism: questions viability and legitimacy of official non-p regime, should be tied to international law and UN Security Council Resolution to make it more legitimate as tool of non-p regime, encourages smugglers to find other ways (eg. via air), risk of worsening international arena and international cooperation (discriminatory testing and interdiction)

...